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THE HEART OF MAN : 



AW ATTEMPT 11^ MENTAL ANATOMY. 



By PUTNAM P. BISHOP. 






' 'EP 17 1S83 J 




CHICAGO: 

SHEPARD & JOHJVTSTOK, PRUSTTERS, 
140-146 MONROE STREET. 

1883. 



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Copyright, 1883, 
By PUTNAM P. BISHOP. 



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CONTENTS 



CHAPTEK I. 

Preliminary Observations. The Anatomical Method ... 5 

CHAPTEE II. 

The Emotive System 15 

CHAPTER III. 
The Acquisitive System 32 

CHAPTER IV. 

The Reactive System . . ^5 

CHAPTER V. 
Volitions 55 

CHAPTER VI. 
Moral Sentiments 68 



THE HEART OF MAK. 



CHAPTEE I. 

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. THE ANATOMICAL METHOD. 

I TAKE the word " heart " in the highest of its popular 
acceptations, and employ it to denote that part of the mental 
organism in which emotions are experienced, desires and 
aflfections exert their force, and volitions take place. 

Already in my first sentence, there is an expression which 
would excite the contempt of many philosophers if they 
should happen to see it. They warn us against thinking of 
the Mind as made up of parts. They tell us that it is 
" unextended " — that it inhabits no space ; and they would 
have us carefully guard against viewing it in the light of 
an organism. I must decline to acknowledge the authority 
of such teachers. However it may be to others, to myself, 
most certainly, an unextended entity is altogether unthink- 
able. I am compelled to employ the concept of space when- 
ever I think of anything as having a substantive existence. 
To me, whatever exists in no space is nowhere, and what is 
nowhere is nothing. I do not aver, however, that Mind 
occupies space to the exclusion of Matter. Whether im- 
penetrability is, or is not, a property of the mental substance. 



6 THE HEART OF MAN. 

is a point on which I have no knowledge.^ But ignorant as I 
must remain concerning the nature of this substance, beyond 
the point at which its self-manifestations cease, I am under a 
necessity to postulate a "Something" in which the powers 
of the Mind inhere, and which affords a field for their move- 
ments and interactions. As names of an entity, such ex- 
pressions as " A thread of consciousness " and " A series of 
' feelings,' " convey no meaning. To talk of " consciousness " 
apart from a conscious subject, or of "feelings" without a 
subject that feels, is to talk nonsense. 

I submit with perfect cheerfulness to .the necessities of 
which I have spoken, since all experience teaches that man 
is constituted for the discovery of truth. Hence, that an 
effort to cast off a necessary conception is a stride in the 
direction of foolishness, can be proved by an induction as 
broad as the whole range of human history. 

Accepting the laws of my nature without reserve, I see 
no middle ground between the position that Mind is an 
extended and organized entity, and the position that all 
mental phenomena are products of our corporeal organism. 
Materialism may justly assert the prior claim to attention, 
for there is reason in the law which requires us, in all cases 
of this kind, to satisfy ourselves of the inadequacy of the 
causes which are known to exist, before assuming the exist- 
ence of an additional cause. I have endeavored to obey this 
law. I have tried honestly to take in all the light which such 
men as Spencer, Bain and Maudsley are able to dispense. I 
am delighted and instructed by their disclosures concerning 
the structure of the brain and of the whole nervous system. 
While they linger in the domain of Anatomy, or in that 



PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 7 

of Physiology proper, I feel that I am following guides who 
know their way. I am deeply interested by their striking 
illustrations of the well known influence of corporeal changes 
upon the mental state, and of mental changes upon the 
corporeal state. But, so soon as they begin to deal with 
the simplest phenomena purely mental^ I find an idea of 
inadequate causation growing upon me. When I place all 
the forces, which they point out, by the side of a complicated 
train of thought, with manifold emotions flashing out here 
and there upon it and interlacing themselves with it, my 
conviction that the former cannot have caused the latter 
becomes so overmastering that I lose all patience with the 
assertion of such origination. I am constrained to suspect 
that such able thinkers as I have named have busied them- 
selves so exclusively with matter that they have become 
incapacitated for observations in which the bodily senses can 
render no aid. Be this as it may, their writings make it 
manifest that they have scarcely pushed their investigations 
across the threshold of mental life, and that they are pro- 
foundly ignorant as to the wonderful things which take place 
in the inner recesses of the human soul. 

Of the countless undisputed products of material organ- 
isms, every one can be proved to consist of matter. Every 
one of therri can be weighed, or measured, or discovered, by 
the microscope ; or its presence can be detected by some 
other physical test. This being true, is the generalization 
unwarranted when we say "All products of material organ- 
isms are themselves material"? If any scientist has gone 
over a wider range in accomplishing his induction, I should 
like to hear his story. Assuredly some centuries will elapse 



THE HEART OF MAN. 



before Evolutionists will gather a greater number of particu- 
lars to prove that all physical organisms are evolved from 
protoplasm. Perhaps it vrill be said that mental phenomena 
are not " products," properly so called, but effects akin to the 
corporeal feelings produced by an internal excitation of our 
nerves of sensation. I deny the validity of the distinction. 
I understand Physiology to teach that transformation of 
matter is a concomitant of all physical organic activity. 
Obviously, then, the new forms of matter, resulting from 
such activity, are immediate material products, and the con- 
sequent feelings are physically evidential of the presence of 
those products. Besides, a discriminating consciousness dis- 
closes so vast a difference between corporeal feelings and 
mental phenomena as almost to compel a recognition of dif- 
ferent origins. The very least that it seems possible to say 
honestly is, that the differences between these two classes of 
phenomena are sufficient to establish an immense probability 
of difference in originating forces. 

The materialistic theory can be antagonized legitimately 
with all the arguments which tend to sustain the authority of 
Christ as a Teacher, and with all other arguments going to 
prove the possibility of mental existence apart from a cor- 
poreal organism. It is very probable that the bringing in of 
such considerations will be called unscientific. I am venture- 
some enough to say, however, that if Science is what its 
name imports, the laying of all departments of knowledge 
under contribution, for the sake of getting at the truth, 
seems to me to characterize the only truly scientific method. 
At all events I shall never board up the windows on any side 



PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 9 

while endeavoring to adjust my conceptions to the realities of 
the universe. 

For myself, I feel no need of support from the classes of 
arguments to which I have just made allusion. I hold that 
the human Mind is a living Being, because I can picture it to 
myself as existing apart from the human body, and can see 
it, in that state of isolation, exhibiting all those " changes, 
simultaneous and successive," which constitute a life com- 
plete in itself. The following chapters are largely taken up 
with the pointing out of such vital movements, and may be 
seen, from one point of view, to contain a continuous assign- 
ment of reasons for the rejection of Materialism. 

The m^ethod of investigation, which I have employed in 
working my way to the conclusions set forth in this discus- 
sion, I call " The Anatomical Method," because it is based on 
the conception of Mind as an organized being, and aims to 
disclose the structure of that being. At the risk of appear- 
ing egotistical, I think it best, at this point, to relate an 
experience. About eighteen years ago I got tired of the 
vagueness of my ideas concerning conscience, and supposed 
I could soon clear them up with the help of the few authors 
accessible to me, I found myself instructed, of course ; but 
the result, on the whole, was exceedingly disappointing. I 
came across no theory that was really useful in dispelling the 
mists in which my moral nature seemed to be enveloped. I 
then put aside my books and attempted, on my own account, 
to analyze the moral sentiments. I soon became convinced 
that " conscience," as the word stands in our literature, is the 
name of an ever-varying assemblage of wholly diverse ele- 
ments, intellectual, emotional,- etc., and ought never to be 



10 THE HEART OF MAN. 

employed where scientific exactness is sought. As to the 
sources of those elements I was still in the dark, and found it 
necessary to go further back for a starting point. After sev- 
eral futile efforts I finally propounded to myself the question, 
What are the primary, undecomposable powers of the human 
soul ? Here I felt that I was making some headway, but had 
not proceeded far before it flashed upon me that I was treat- 
ing the Mind as an organism, and ascribing different func- 
tions to its respective parts. I remembered, of course, that 
Sir William Hamilton says, "Man is not an organism." 
Nevertheless I persevered, and the farther I proceeded the 
firmer seemed the ground I was treading. From that time to 
this I have found great delight in conceiving the human 
Mind as an organized being, inhabiting a corporeal organism 
for the present, and affected immensely by that immediate 
environment, yet capable of living a life altogether its own. 
I have been conscious of no wavering in the opinion that the 
human Mind has a structure as definitive as that of the 
human body, and equally open to examination by one who is 
sufliciently resolute and able to hold his .faculties to their 
work with suflicient steadiness. Hence I anticipate very san- 
guinely that the Mental Anatomists of the future will make 
good for Psychology a permanent footing among exact 
sciences. 

Most of the contents of the following chapters were writ- 
ten out during the period of which I have spoken; and, after 
all these years, I see little to change except in the matter of 
terminology and in the way of cond^sation. It is possible 
that I am far astray in all my conclusions; but I cannot divest 
myself of the conviction that the lack of progress and of pop- 



PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 11 

ular interest in psychological studies is largely due to the 
treatment of the mind as an unextended and unorganized 
"principle," or whatever else it is called, of which no con- 
ception can be formed. I believe, too, that a mere intellec- 
tual craving for a substantial and conceivable ground of 
mental phenomena has caused thousands of intelligent men 
to acquiesce in Materialism. 

I distinguish in the mental structure five distinct systems, 
in each of which I see a distinct elementary power inhering. 
They are as follows: 

1. The Sensory System; a system of mental senses. 

2. The Intellective System; a system of faculties. 

3. The Emotive System; a system of susceptibilities. 

4. The Acquisitive System; a system of desires. 

5. The Reactive System; a system of affections. 

The elementary powers inhering in these systems, respec- 
tively, I call: Mental Sense, Intellect, Emotivity, Acquisi- 
tivity and Reactivity. 

THE SENSORY SYSTEM. 

Mental sense is the mind's power to take impressions from 
matter. It is that by which mind, as a recipient, is placed in 
correspondence with the material universe. In our present 
stage of being, the Sensory System is reached through our 
nerves of sensation and four special corporeal organs. If 
matter has classes of properties which cannot make themselves 
known through these avenues, the mind must remain igno- 
rant of such properties so long as its inclusion in a material 
organism shall last. It is plain that we are not in a position 
to say that the entire Sensory System can now be brought 
under examination. 



12 THE HEART OF MAN. 

THE INTELLECTIVE SYSTEM. 

The primary office of intellect is the ascertainment of 
truth. This involves the retention or permanent possession 
of truth, because continued ascertainment depends on the 
utilization of truth already ascertained. As I profess to treat 
only of the three systems which constitute the heart, I might, 
without impropriety, pass at once from this topic. I prefer, 
however, to say frankly that I have never attempted a thoroug-h 
exploration of the Intellective System. My belief is that 
mental anatomists will hereafter make in the intellective part 
of our nature some important discoveries to which the ablest 
psychologists have never been able to attain in conceiving the 
mind as unorganized. If I were prosecuting researches in 
this field I should hold myself rigidly to the conception of the 
Intellective System as a system of Faculties, having Truth 
for their central object, and I should seek an exhaustive an- 
swer to this question: What are the structural provisions for 
the ascertainment, permanent possession, application, em- 
bodiment and expression of truth? I am satisfied that very 
insufficient study has been bestowed on what may be called 
" the executive processes " of intellect — the processes through 
which expedients are chosen, plans are constructed, machinery 
is invented and truth is made ready for expression in art and 
language. 

There are three faculties, the workings of which are ob- 
served by everyone. I name them : the Intuitive Faculty, 
the Associative Faculty and the Introspective Faculty. 

The existence of the Intuitive Faculty, as well as the fact 
of intuition, is, of course, denied by those philosophers who 
maintain that all our knowledge is derived from experience. 



PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 13 

My patience with such men is hardly commensurate with the 
patience which would be elicited by a persistent endeavor to 
convince me that I lack a right arm. Some of them are 
blessed with wonderful endowments, but they are victims of 
a voluntary mania, which keeps them struggling to convince 
themselves and the world of the worthlessness of all our 
knowledge ; and their work is uniformly pernicious. The 
Intuitive Faculty manifests its presence and power at the 
lirst dawning of infantile intelligence ; it accompanies every 
attentive exercise of the organs addressed by the external 
world, and it is operative when the dying man bestows his 
last look on the faces of loved ones at his bedside. The 
instant a sensory impression is received, the Intuitive Faculty 
asserts the reality of that from which the impression pro- 
ceeds. I venture here to throw out the remark that this last 
sentence seems to me to comprise a full statement of what 
takes place in sense perception. The ultimate facts are a 
sensory impression, and an intuition of reality. The inter- 
pretation of sensory impressions, by ascription of properties 
to objects perceived, is the work of other faculties, and is 
sometimes erroneous, while the Intuitive Faculty is infallible. 
I find myself in full sympathy with Sir William Hamil- 
ton when he indignantly protests against certain doctrines 
because they imply that "the root of our nature is a lie." 
And yet the absolute and invariable trueness of our necessary 
beliefs is abundantly substantiated in another way. It is 
enough to know that, while false beliefs are plunging thou- 
sands in distress every hour, no man, in all the ages, was ever 
misled to his own harm by a necessary belief ; that the 
Intuitive Faculty has so commended itself to all men that 



14 THE HEART OF MAN. 

even those who deny its existence are ready, at any moment, 
to risk their lives on its veracity, and that the constant 
assumption of such veracity is an indispensable condition of 
safety. Let any man consider what would happen to him if 
he should contradict in practice the affirmations of the Intui- 
tive Faculty as to Reality and Causation. 



CHAPTEK II. 



THE EMOTIVE SYSTEM. 



Emotivity is the Heart's power to experience pleasure 
and pain from operations of Intellect. For each elementary 
form of pleasure, caused by a simple intellective action, the 
Emotive System presents an original Susceptibility. Other- 
wise, that form of pleasure could not be experienced. As 
pain is the opposite of pleasure, so each original Susceptibility 
of pleasure is, at the same time, a Susceptibility of pain from 
the opposite of that intellective action which causes the 
specific form of pleasure. Hence, in making a survey of the 
Emotive System, we have only to ascertain 

THE PRIMARY INTELLECTIVE CAUSES OF PLEASURE. 

These may be divided into two classes, according as the 
quality, relation, or state, which Intellect employs as a 
medium in the production of pleasure, is within the Mind, or 
external to it. In the former case, I call the Intellective 
Cause a Consciousness ; in the latter, a Perception. 

Before entering upon a demonstration of the original Sus- 
ceptibilities, I think it proper to remark that I believe an 
exclusive reliance on the Introspective Faculty, in psychologi- 
cal investigations, to be an immense mistake. As mental 
development progresses, the intellective processes, the emo- 
tions, desires and affections become more and more complex, 
and it becomes increasingly difficult for the Introspective 



16 THE HEART OF MAN. 

Faculty to reveal an elementary mental action. For this 
reason, I have relied largely, as will be perceived, on the 
observation of manifestations of mental life in childhood. 
At that period, there is no secretiveness to thwart us ; lively 
emotions and strong impulses display their well known signs, 
and the general simplicity of mental action enables us to dis- 
pense with laborious analyses. I now proceed to what I 
regard as a complete list of the primary Intellective causes of 
pleasure. 

1. Consciousness of Knowing. 

I first used the word "Knowledge," instead of "Know- 
ing "; but I saw that the emotion for which I was aiming to 
account, might be confounded with the self-complacency 
which a man experiences when he says to himself, " I possess 
a great store of information," whereas it is totally different. 
On the other hand, I have been, at times, inclined to name 
this cause simply "Knowing," and to treat the pleasure pro- 
duced by it as merely the emotive reflex of intellective appre- 
hension. It is certain that unmistakable signs of this special 
form of pleasure are observable before any keen introspection 
becomes possible. Still, I believe that, in the earliest stages 
of mental life, a certain dim thought of selfhood accompanies 
the emotion under consideration, and very soon a clear con- 
sciousness is manifested by such exclamations as "I see! 
I see!" 

That Consciousness of Knowing is a primary cause of 
pleasure, will not, I think, be questioned. As the first in- 
quisitive gaze of the infant evinces a spontaneous reaching 
of Intellect after truth, so the smile, with which its appre- 
hensions are greeted, can be accounted for only on the hypo- 



THE EMOTIVE SYSTEM. 17 

thesis of an original susceptibility to that cause. As Intellect 
expands and its various faculties awaken to activity, if the 
tendency to reach after truth is judiciously stimulated and 
guided, the ebullient joy in learning names, apprehending 
distinctions and discovering uses, testifies still more strongly 
to the benign power of Consciousness of Knowing. Who has 
not observed the glee with which the little one points out 
the letters of the alphabet that have been learned, or attempts 
to name the articles of furniture in the room? Every in- 
telligent mother understands the beguiling of infantile grief 
by asking "What is this?" and taxing her ingenuity to 
bring about new apprehensions. In later years Consciousness 
of Knowing goes into combination with other Intellective 
causes of pleasure, and, perhaps, is not often found apart from 
them. But the susceptibility to it continues to be a well- 
spring of joy, which needs only to be kept open in order to 
yield a copious stream to the end of life. 

There are two circumstances by which the form of the 
pleasure thus produced is greatly affected. One of them is 
the order of apprehensions. When this is such that ideas 
akin to each other are raised successively, the emotion is like 
the tranquil flowing of a stream, more or less rapid, and 
continually deepening. But when apprehensions follow each 
other in such order, that strongly contrasted ideas are brought 
into being almost simultaneously, we have that titillation of 
spirit which is called the Sense of the Ludicrous, and finds 
expression in laughter. I would not be understood to say 
that this emotional state is occasioned in no other way. 
Laughter is often excited through peculiar operations of 
other Intellective Causes. But there are numerous cases in 
2 



18 THE HEART OF MAN. 

which the emotions under consideration can be ascribed onply 
to the order of apprehensions. We here discover a law 
evidently designed to give variety to our joys, and to refit 
Intellect for effective labor. Renewed elasticity and vigor 
are acquired in the fantastic mental actions occasioned by 
the combination of incongruous ideas, and by the presence of 
odd, grotesque and comical conceptions. 

In the second place, the pleasure, caused by Consciousness 
of Knowing, is affected by the character of that which is 
known. This is a momentous fact. The comparatively un- 
important truths, apprehended in early childhood, yield only 
a childish delight. The apprehensions, occasioned by gossip, 
cause only a petty pleasure. But the consciousness of know- 
ing a sublime truth, a far-reaching relation, or a compre- 
hensive law, raises, dilates and fills the soul with a joy 
beyond expression. 

2. Consciousness of Power. 

The first idea of power arises from physical action ; and 
the earliest consciousness of it is the reflex of physical 
exertion. Very soon it begins to be measured by the distance 
passed over, the weight raised, or the resistance otherwise 
overcome. The memory of every one, who has seen children 
at play, will furnish abundg-nt evidence of the title of this 
Consciousness to be ranked among primary causes of pleasure. 
As Intellect grows the Consciousness of Power attaches itself 
to intellectual exertion. Then it becomes intimately, though 
not inseparably, associated with Consciousness of Knowing, 
and doubles the pleasure produced by that Cause. When the 
period of planning and contriving arrives, a new field is 
opened. When, for example, a child first places a chair and 



THE EMOTIVE SYSTEM. 19 

climbs upon it, to take something from a table, a look of 
triumph evinces the delight which springs from conscious- 
ness of power to devise and execute that plan. The con- 
sciousness of knowing how to perform the feat may after- 
ward present itself ; but I am convinced that, in most cases, 
Power is the sole medium of the first joy. 

Again, we find Consciousness of Power uniting itself with 
the active impulses of the mind. When the impulse is pleas- 
ant i n itself, the pleasure is heightened by a sense of its strength ; 
and when it is painful the pain is greatly modified by the 
same cause. Our capacity to maintain fixed purposes affords 
a conspicuous field for this form of pleasure. One has but to 
search one's own internal history in order to be convinced that 
power of determination is, in itself, and without reference to 
its object, an important source of enjoyment. 

Under this head, also, we may say that the amount and 
quality of the pleasure produced are affected by several circum- 
stances. In the first place, other things being equal, the value 
of the emotion is governed by the order of the faculties from 
the exertion of which the consciousness proceeds. The low- 
est form is that which results from the exercise of physical 
power. IsText comes the pleasure which is added to the pro- 
duct of Consciousness of Knowing in the mere acquisition of in- 
formation. Far richer than this is the fruit of power in reason- 
ing, in moving step by step, from deduction to deduction, toward 
a triumphant conclusion. Still more intensely delightful is 
Consciousness of Powder to devise and combine expedients for 
the accomplishment of a great end. And yet higher than 
this is the pleasure yielded by that power w^hich moves men 
to great achievements through the instrumentality of truth. 



20 THE HEART OF MAN. 

Again, the pleasure due to this cause is measured by the 
resistance overcome. This is merely saying that the result- 
ant enjoyment is proportionate to the power necessarily em- 
ployed. The law applies to every exercise of power, whether 
in the overcoming of physical resistance in the solving of 
difficult problems, in the influencing of men, in the regulation 
of one's own habits, or in the ruling of one's own spirit. 

Finally, the other conditions being fulfilled, the value of 
.the pleasure depends on the number of faculties brought into 
co-operative activity. Let the physical energies, Perception, 
Memory, Imagination, Reason and the faculties of expression 
be all aroused, each every instant throwing in its force to 
accelerate the one sweeping movement, and Consciousness of 
Power will then di-splay the fullness of its worth. The emo- 
tions experienced on such an occasion are affected, of course, 
by the nature of the object aimed at; but, so far as this is 
the case, the result is traceable to other intellective causes. It 
should be noted that pleasure thus originated is not confined 
to the hours in which powdr achieves its triumphs. It is re- 
newed when Memory recalls those hours, and is often antici- 
pated while the triumphant moments are still in the future. 

3. Consciousjiess of Oionership. 

The term "Ownership" is chosen in preference to "Prop- 
erty," because it is broader and less liable to be misappre- 
hended. I mean by it that relation to an object which enables 
me to speak of it as mine. That the consciousness of that re- 
lation is pleasurable, needs no proof. That it manifests itself 
in early childhood is equally unquestionable. The only point 
open to dispute concerns the possibility of its being included 
in Consciousness of Power. And I think all doubt on that 



THE EMOTIVE SYSTEM. 21 

point will disappear when it is considered that the right of 
exclusive control does not enter into the essence of Owner- 
ship. For reasons which could easily be explained, the idea 
of such a right is often associated with Consciousness of Own- 
ership; and, in such cases, much of the resultant pleasure can 
be traced to Consciousness of Power. But we frequently 
use the possessive pronouns without the faintest notion of 
right or ability to exercise control. We say "Jiy father," "J/y 
mother," "My party," "My church," "My country," and the 
delightful consciousness which finds expression in that em- 
phatic "My^'' is plainly irreducible. There is certainly noth- 
ing in it which bears a near resemblance to anything in Con- 
sciousness of Power. I shall hereafter have occasion to show 
that the office of this intellective cause of pleasure is im- 
mensely important. 

4. Perception of Sympathy. 

I shall be understood, of course, to mean that we experi- 
ence pleasure in perceiving Sympathy with ourselves. It is 
hard to explain how this cause of pleasure has escaped the 
notice of so many philosophers. They have much to say con- 
cerning Sympathy* itself ; and some of them unduly magnify 
its influence in originating mental phenomena. But concern- 
ing the pleasure that rises within us at the manifestation of 
Sympathy with ourselves, they say, little, if anything. No 
list of original impulses with which I am acquainted includes 
Desire of Sympathy. Yet one of the first things evinced by 
the infant soul is susceptibility of pleasure in finding its joys 
and sorrows shared by others. A little hurt is instantly 
changed to a benefit by that cause. All joys are multiplied 
by it. Much of the earliest prattle consists in calling atten- 



22 THE HEA.RT OF MAN. 

tion to this and that, in order that apprehensions and emotions 
may be shared. In later years the susceptibility is continu- 
ally manifesting its power. Our enjoyment of a landscape, a 
picture, a poem, a pleasing event, or a successful achievement, 
is incomplete till we are assured of Sympathy. The concep- 
tion of this pleasure gives society its chief attraction, and is 
a principal stimulus to conversation, as well as to the advo- 
cacy of cherished opinions. The skillful management of the 
susceptibility has made the fortunes of many poets and other 
artists. After vainly endeavoring to trace these effects to 
some other Intellective cause, I deem it unquestionable that, 
if anything in man is original and ultimate. Susceptibility of 
Pleasure in Perception of Sympathy has that character. 

5. Perception of Favorable Regard. 

My reason for using the expression " Favorable Regard," 
instead of "Esteem," is obvious. The latter term is far too 
narrow, while the former includes affection, admiration and 
all other sentiments complimentary to their object. There 
can be no doubt that affection is the form of regard in the 
perception of which pleasure is first exhibited. The child is 
delighted by a loving embrace before a favorable opinion can 
be comprehended. Were it not for this, and one or two 
other facts, I should be strongly inclined to deny the origi- 
nality of a Susceptibility to this Intellective Cause, and to 
ascribe the pleasure derived from Favorable Regard to a Per- 
ception of Sympathy with the perceiver's self-complacency, in 
connection with the strength added to the latter feeling by 
commendation. It is evident that commendatory manifes- 
tations often owe much of their pleasureableness to these 
influences. Yet, as I have intimated, there are some phe- 



THE EMOTIVE SYSTEM. 23 

nomena for which I cannot account without classing Favor- 
able Regard among Primary Media of Pleasure. The matter 
would seem to be set at rest by the fact, that some persons 
are willing to exchange self-complacency for praise. Such is 
their conception of the value of Favorable Regard that, for 
the sake of it, they are willing to forfeit their own esteem. 

6. Consciousness of Goodness. 

A certain degree of mental growth necessarily precedes 
the manifestation of the Susceptibility corresponding with 
this cause of pleasure. The idea of personal quality must 
come into being, and a Mind must become able to reflect on 
its own character. But, so soon as this stage of development 
is reached, the Susceptibility is apparent to every thoughtful 
observer. The earliest qualitative discrimination is the act 
of distinguishing between Goodness and Badness. In the 
first instance it is objective ; external things are classed as 
good, or bad. This classification results inevitably from the 
reaction of Emotivity on Intellect. A perception is either 
pleasurable or painful, and, according as it is the one or the 
other, a favorable, or an unfavorable, judgment is immediately 
and spontaneously passed upon that which is perceived. The 
object then continues to be regarded as good, or bad, unless 
the judgment is reversed through subsequent operations of 
Intellect on Emotivity and the inevitable reactions of the 
latter on the former. When the child begins to reflect on its 
own qualities, a similar classification is made in these, and is 
corrected in a similar manner. All its qualities, physical, 
intellectual and moral, are regarded with pleasure or pain, 
and classed, accordingly, ^s good or bad. 

Now, as favorable judgment is the fruit of pleasure experi- 



24 THE HEART OF MAN. 

enced in the observation of that upon which the judgment is 
passed, it is self-evident that Consciousness of Goodness must 
be pleasurable. It may seem, however, that to predicate of 
this consciousness the production of pleasure, is to put the 
effect for the cause. But I think it will be found that the 
qualities, which please us when observed within ourselves, 
have, in every instance, been classed already as good by an 
objective discrimination. They have already addressed the 
soul and yielded pleasure in the Emotive System ; and 
Emotivity has reacted on Intellect in causing a favorable 
judgment. We find, therefore, something exceedingly admi- 
rable in our being so constituted that, in the order of develop- 
ment, external observation shall precede self-knowledge. It 
is thus provided that our own qualities shall first come under 
our notice in association with judgments already passed upon 
them. The discovery in ourselves of a quality, already 
classed as good, is neither more nor less than a Consciousness 
of Goodness ; and, as this Consciousness precedes and produces 
the pleasure we experience in regarding ourselves favorably, 
it is correctly set down as the Intellective Cause of that form 
of pleasure. 

I see no occasion for argument in support of the view, 
that we have an original Susceptibility of Pleasure in Con- 
sciousness of Goodness. The pleasure thus originated is the 
emotional element in self-complacency. To be sure, this 
term is often applied to emotions produced by other Intel- 
lective Causes. A man is said to be self-complacent in view 
of his position in society, of the extent of his possessions, or 
of the power with which circumstances have clothed him. 
In these cases his pleasure is due chiefly to Perception of 



THE EMOTIVE SYSTEM. 25 

Favorable Regard, Consciousness of Ownership, or Conscious- 
ness of Power. Strictly speaking, he has complacency in his 
external condition, and not in himself. But the case is 
entirely different when we experience delight in contemplat- 
ing our own qualities, and calling them good, while all 
thoughts of them in their relations to our other susceptibil- 
ities are excluded. That we are capable of such experiences, 
can be denied by no one accustomed to introspection ; and 
that this form of enjoyment is manifested in utmost simplic- 
ity by young children, is equally plain to every observer. It 
will appear, in the course of this discussion, that Susceptibil- 
ity to Consciousness of Goodness is an unspeakably valuable 
endowment, since it lies at the very foundation, or rather, 
since it is the very foundation of our Moral Nature. 

In carrying forward our survey of the Emotive System, 
we now meet with two Intellective Causes of Pleasure dif- 
fering, in an important particular, from those already con- 
sidered. They are perceptions of Media merely as objects of 
contemplation, — Media having no special relation to the 
perceiver ; neither existing within him, nor operating toward 
him. The distinction is obvious. Knowledge, Power, Own- 
ership and Goodness have been described as entering into 
the state of the conscious Mind ; Sympathy and Favorable 
Regard as having the perceiver for their object. But the 
causes, which I am about to mention, may produce pleasure 
without awakening a thought of self. 

1. Perception of Goodness. 

I have shown how the idea of Goodness arises, and how^ 
the qualities of external things come to be classed as good or 
bad. When I say that we are, by virtue of mental organi- 



26 THE HEART OF MAN. 

zation, susceptible of pleasure in Perception of Goodness, I 
simply assert that we are in such correspondence with the 
material and the spiritual universe, that numberless things 
apart from ourselves, and making no appeal to the suscepti- 
bilities heretofore pointed out, are capable of affecting us 
agreeably: certain sights, sounds, odors and tastes, and certain 
acts, relations and traits of character give us pleasure without 
producing a thought of anything pertaining to ourselves or 
tending to affect our condition. Such thoughts may be ex- 
cited simultaneously by other Intellective Causes ; but the 
enjoyment is highest when Perception of Goodness is the 
sole action of Intellect. 

It will be observed that I use the term " Goodness " in 
its most comprehensive sense. It may be predicated of every 
being, every form of matter, every event, every action, every 
course of thought and every other conceivable subject of 
which the perception, without the intervention of any one of 
the other Intellective Causes, can produce delight in an 
unperverted Emotive System. The forms of Goodness are 
numberless. It embraces beauty, fitness, utility, rectitude, 
strength, and every other desirable quality and combination 
of qualities. Through the growth of Intellect all the primary 
Media of Pleasure come to be regarded abstractedly as good, 
though every Intellective Cause continues to have an inde- 
pendent operation. 

At first the idea of Goodness shares in the vagueness of 
all other ideas. It is no more than a gen*eral favorable 
impression. But the intellective vision gradually acquires 
acuteness, and various distinctions are made. From the be- 
ginning, much of a child's attention is occupied with human 



THE EMOTIVE SYSTEM. 27 

beings. Very early, too, it shows itself favorably impressed 
by some, and unfavorably by others. It clings to one 
stranger and shrinks from another. It looks upon some as 
good, and upon others as bad. Then it begins to distinguish 
personal qualities, and becomes able to assign reasons for its 
likings and aversions. At a later stage of development the 
various forms of Goodness are classified. Physical Goodness, 
in the forms of beauty, grandeur, movements suggestive of 
power, etc., is seen to differ from intellectual Goodness. At 
length moral Goodness — Goodness of disposition, of inten- 
tion, of volition and habit — is discovered to be distinct from 
every other species. Through all these stages of growth. 
Susceptibility to Perception of Goodness keeps pace with the 
intellective power of discernment. 

8. Percejytiofi of Happiness. 

There is a point of view from which this cause of pleas- 
ure may seem to be included in the preceding one. It may be 
said that happiness is merely Goodness of condition; and, there- 
fore, that Perception of Happiness is only preception of a 
form of Goodness. But this position will not bear a moment's 
scrutiny. Both Happiness and Goodness may be predicated of 
the internal state of a rational being; and, however insepar- 
able they may appear, we know that they are not one and the 
same. Both the conception and the emotion which we have 
when we say that a being is good are widely dift'erent from 
those which lead us to say that a being is happy. This matter 
is put at rest w^hen we remember how often we have occasion 
at the same time to rejoice over the eminent Goodness of a 
man, and to deplore his unhappiness. 

No one will deny that we naturally take pleasure in per^ceiv- 



28 THE HEART OF MAN. 

ing the Happiness of other beings. This is assumed intuitively 
by every one. We try to please an infant by smiles and other 
signs of joy in ourselves. The Happiness of children depends 
very largely upon the evidences of Happiness which they wit- 
ness in those around them; and this continues to be true of 
most persons to the end of life. Though there is no limit to 
the perversions possible within the human soul, it is hard to 
find a man who has wholly lost his capacity to be pleased by 
the pleasure of others. Envy, while intensely active may 
paralyze the Susceptibility. It may disappear for the moment 
under the force of reflections awakened by the contrast be- 
tween one's own condition and that of another. Misanthropy 
must nearly annihilate it. But the most hardened persons 
show occasionally that they derive enjoyment from the Hap- 
piness of their fellow-men, and are pained by their unhappi- 
ness. It is notorious that a man who can no longer be moved 
to acts of compassion instinctively shuns every scene of suf- 
fering unless he is impelled toward it by desire of gain or 
by some other strong passion. While it is easy to see that 
Perception of Happiness is more liable than other Intellec- 
tive Causes of Pleasure to be rendered inoperative by the an- 
tagonism of selfishness, the perverting forces which it is able 
to withstand bear witness to ifs original strength. 

Although the facts above stated will be admitted univer- 
sally, some will maintain that the pleasure ascribed to this 
Cause is due to self-regard. In the view of many, the illusions 
of Sympathy are boundless. Such will say that when we are 
pleased by exhibitions of the happiness of other beings, we 
simply imagine ourselves in their conditions. Others will 
hold, that in such cases we persuade ourselves that like happi- 



THE EMOTIYE SYSTEM. 29 

ness is in store for ns, and derive our enjoyment from that 
anticipation. I admit that Imagination is usually active in 
connection with Perception of Happiness; but its ordinary 
effect is only to render the perception more vivid. That it 
often amounts to an illusion, I do not believe. In scrutinizing 
my own internal histofy I cannot discover a single instance 
in which such a thing took place. I know, too, that I have 
found delight a thousand times in witnessing forms of enjoy- 
ment of which I had not the faintest expectation. An old 
man whose vitality is nearly exhausted and who moves about 
only with the greatest difficulty, sits in the doorway and ob- 
serves the sports of his grandchildren. He is delighted by 
the exuberance of their animal spirits and by the joy indi- 
cated in their agile movements. Yet he neither imagines 
himself a child, nor expects to engage in such sports. He 
simply forgets himself; and, did he not do so, he would groan 
because of the contrast between his own physical state and 
that of the children. 

The truth of the matter seems to be this: Every form of the 
pleasure perceived produces a certain likeness of itself in the 
Emotive System of the perceiver. It is reflected there as in 
a mirror. And as every emotion is a form of pleasure or a 
form of pain or a combination of the two, this imaging of 
the form is the beginning and the end of emotive Sympathy. 
Nor is there anything very peculiar in this. It is only a re- 
sult of the general law: Pleasure* shares in the modifications 
of its Media. We have seen that the pleasure which proceeds 
from Knowing is affected by the character of that which is 
Known, and that the emotive product of Power depends on the 
form of the Power apprehended in Consciousness. A similar 



30 TFTE HEART OF MAN. 

dependence of the form of the emotion may be asserted in 
connection with all the primary Media of Pleasure. In the 
present case, as Pleasure stands over against Pleasure, the re- 
semblance is, of course, unusually distinct.. 

For aught that I can see, our examination of the Emotive 
System is now complete. We have discovered eight original 
Susceptibilities corresponding, respectively, with the same 
number of Intellective Causes. That the names of these 
Susceptibilities may be fully descriptive, I set them down as . 
follows : 

1. Susceptibility to Consciousness of Knowing, and Con- 
sciousness of Not-Knowing. 

2. Susceptibility to Consciousness of Power and Con- 
sciousness of weakness. 

3. Susceptibility to Consciousness of Ownership and Con- 
sciousness of Destitution. 

4. Susceptibility to Perception of Sympathy and Percep- 
tion of Lack of Sympathy. 

5. Susceptibility to Perception of Favorable Regard and 
Perception of Unfavorable Regard. 

6. Susceptibility to Consciousness of Goodness and Con- 
sciousness of Badness. 

7. Susceptibility to Perception of Goodness and Percep- 
tion of Badness. 

8. Susceptibility to Perception of Happiness and Percep- 
tion of Unhappiness. 

I have studied no simple emotion v/hich cannot be traced 
to one of these Susceptibilities, and no compound emotion 
whose elements may not be found to have originated in two 
or more of them. On the other hand, if this list of original 



THE EMOTIVE SYSTEM. 31 

Susceptibilities can be reduced, I confess my inability to hit 
upon the method of reduction. 

Perhaps I can obviate a little perplexity by explaining 
here that I give the name " Medium of Pleasure " to that with 
which Intellect busies itself in operating on the Susceptibili- 
ties. Knowing, Power, Ownership, Sympathy, Favorable 
Regard, Goodness, Foreign Goodness and Foreign Happiness, 
I call " Primary Media of Pleasure." 



CHAPTER III. 



THE ACQUISITIVE SYSTEM. 



We can picture to ourselves a being with only the three 
systems already considered, and having no elementary power 
save Mental Sense, Intellect and Emotivity. Though such a 
being might present spontaneously all the internal changes 
which necessarily enter into a just conception of life, it would 
not be an agreeable object of contemplation. It could have 
no voluntary activity, and no impulse to exertion. It would 
be an aimless thing, drifting in the universe as chance might 
carry it. Its gratifications would be few and childish. 
Intellect, receiving no stimulus, the Intellective Causes of 
Pleasure would be feeble and limited to narrow ranges. We 
may find aid in forming a conception of the necessary state 
of such a being by abstracting, from their purely animal life, 
the indolent and aimless mental existence with which some 
men are content. But such is not the normal state of the 
human soul. It presents appearances of which we can see no 
explanation in the three elementary powers above named ; 
and it is necessary, therefore, to continue our exploration. 

One of the most conspicuous manifestations of mental life 
is a spontaneous reaching after objects, with a purpose to 
grasp them and reduce them to. possession. This is the 
underlying and common characteristic of all desires. The 
power, thus spontaneously manifesting itself, I call Acquisi- 
tivity ; and I hold it to be an elementary power without which 



THE ACQUISITIVE SYSTEM. 33 

man would not be man. In my view, the action of an Intel- 
lective Cause of Pleasure upon Emotivity is followed by a 
reaching out of Acquisitivity after the Medium of the 
pleasure then experienced. Intellect and Emotivity originate 
the emotion, and Acquisitivity then demands a repetition, or 
a greater measure of it. Again, the Associative Faculty 
couples the peculiar form of pleasure with its Medium, and 
this, being the more definitely conceived, beconies the most 
conspicuous object of Acquisitivity. Such, I am convinced, is 
the genesis of all desires. Nothing is proved against this 
view by the fact, that we often desire what we have never 
possessed. In every such case the gratification desired is the 
fruit of Intellective Causes, of which we have had abundant 
experience. Moreover, Imagination provides for an associ- 
ation of specific enjoyment with a remote Medium quite as 
intimate as that which results from the actual possession of 
that Medium. At the same time, the fancied pleasurable- 
ness of the desired object often exceeds its actual gratifying 
power, because the pleasing features stand out in high relief 
while avery drawback is wholly concealed. The origination 
of desire under such circumstances may be illustrated as 
follows : A man, who has always been poor, ardently desires 
to be rich. In the first place, he has experienced delight 
from Consciousness of Power, Consciousness of Ownership, 
and Perception of Favorable Regard. In the second place, 
under the impulsion of Acquisitivity, he has asked, " What 
would secure to me the combination of these delights in per- 
manence ? " Then Imagination has responded by picturing 
him in the possession of riches. Pie sees none of the cares 
and annoyances incident to that condition, but numberless 
3 



34 THE HEART OF MAN. 

forms of pleasure have become associated with it in his con- 
ceptions. Thus an intense longing for wealth has arisen 
within him. 

This theory of the genesis of desires is susceptible of 
abundant confirmation. It is obvious, for instance, to every 
observer of infancy that pleasure in each primary Intellective 
Cause precedes the desire of its Medium. The pleasure from 
Consciousness of Knowing precedes Desire of Knowing. If 
the impulsion of desire is inferred from the inquisitive gaze 
of the child, we can answer at once that the inference is un- 
necessary, since the spontaneous reaching of Intellect after 
truth sufficiently accounts for the phenomenon. It is still 
plainer that the delightful Consciousness of Power goes 
before Desire of Power. The same order is observable in the 
appearance of every desire of a primary Medium of Pleasure. 
The evidences of enjoyment are visible before any movement 
of Acquisitivity toward that which occasions it is indicated. 

Again, we know that, in later years, many desires are 
actually formed in the manner described. Some persons 
instinctively shrink from gay society until they are brought 
by chance, or by constraint, to taste its attractions, and then 
become extravagantly fond of it. No one craves the excite- 
ments connected with dissipation unless he has previously 
fallen under their power. The great fear of parents is, that 
their sons will, in some way, be led into vicious indulgences 
and thus have originated within them perverse desires from 
which they are now free. All intelligent guides of the 
young endeavor to awaken elevated aspirations by occasion- 
ing elevated forms of enjoyment, and stimulating Acquisi- 
tivity to demand their repetition in greater intensity. In 



THE ACQUISITIVE SYSTEM. 35 

many such ways the correctness of our theory is constantly 
assumed. 

Aside from these considerations, it is hard to see how 
any object can be desired before experience and the Asso- 
ciative Faculty have clothed it with pleasurableness. Our 
Consciousness testifies that, whenever we crave an object, we 
believe it capable of affording us enjoyment. We know that 
the association of pleasurableness with that object actually 
exists ; and it would be altogether unphilosophical to treat 
that association as ultimate when it is so easy to trace it to 
previous interactions of Intellect and Emotivity. 

According to the view here set forth, none of those 
impulses, usually classed as implanted desires, are underived. 
But it is equally clear that several tendencies of that nature 
are inevitably originated at a very early age. At the first 
experience of pleasure the action in the Emotive System is 
communicated to Acquisitivity, and the result is a vague 
Desire of Pleasure. Through subsequent experiences partic- 
ular forms of pleasure become associated with the several 
Primary Media, and we have specific desires corresponding, 
respectively, with our original Susceptibilities, as Desire of 
Knowing, Desire of Power, Desire of Ownership, etc. These 
I call Primary Desires, and I am inclined to regard them as 
so many branches of that general Desire of Pleasure which is 
operative in every movement of Acquisitivity. Such a view 
affords no support to those who deny the possibility of un- 
selfishness. They have been refuted already in our exami- 
nation of the Emotive System. In the simple fact that, by 
•virtue of its organization, the Mind is susceptible of pleasure 
from Consciousness of Goodness, Perception of Goodness and 



36 THE HEART OF MAN. 

Perception of Happiness, there lies and indestructible foun- 
dation for unselfishness. Besides, every one ought to under- 
stand that it is an abuse of terms to characterize any legiti- 
mate reaching of the soul after pleasure as selfish. That 
epithet is applicable only to perversions of the impulses 
necessarily originated by interactions of our elementary 
powers. 

Desire of Pleasure, as we have seen, inevitably branches 
into eight Primary Desires. As the simple emotions, spring- 
ing from the original Susceptibilities, are capable of an 
endless variety of combinations, and as the compound emo- 
tions thus produced may become associated with specific 
objects, it is plain that an unlimited number of specific 
desires can be permanently established in the Acquisitive 
System. Nevertheless, we continue through life to be often 
conscious of Desire of Pleasure in its original form. We 
have a vague longing for enjoyment without a distinct con- 
ception of any object as its Medium — a certain unrest of soul 
in which we are moved to say, " I want something ; I know 
not what." We sometinxes call it a craving for excitement ; 
but it is obviously Desire of Pleasure not determined to any 
Medium, near, or remote. And here we discover an unspeak- 
ably important office of Acquisitivity. It is designed to 
urge us on to ever-enlarging possession of the Primary Media 
of Pleasure ; and, therefore, it allows us no permanent repose 
while we are shrinking from the pursuit of those objects. 

There is another form which this general desire assumes 
when life is prolonged for a few years. It unites itself with 
all anticipations, and, in that union, it is co-extensive in its 
reach with the associated conception of future existence. At 



THE ACQUISITIVE SYSTEM. ^ 37 

length the idea, as it has been called, of " what is best on the 
whole " is formed, and immediately Desire of Happiness, in the 
proper sense of the name, springs into being. Jouffroy and 
others are right, therefore, when they term this " a desire of 
secondary formation," though its evolution, in a normally 
constituted Mind, is as certain and inevitable as that of any 
Primary Desire. There is propriety, likewise, in classing 
Desire of Happiness as a "rational desire," since its existence 
presupposes that contemplation of the distant future which is 
peculiar to rational beings. Its surpassing importance in the 
mental economy will be set forth hereafter. It is sufficient, 
for the present, to say that we should never lose sight of 
the distinction between Desire of Happiness and Desire of 
Pleasure. The vast difference between the two, as well as 
their co-existence, is abundantly manifested by their per- 
petual conflicts with each other. 

Of most of the Primary Desires but little need be said at 
this time. Their existence will be admitted without extended 
argument ; and it would not accord with my plan to dwell 
here upon their legitimate uses, or upon the perversions to 
which they are liable. I must call attention, however, to the 
fact that these desires are not connected with conceptions of 
the Primary Media of Pleasure as personal characteristics. 
Whenever a Medium is thus conceived it is a form of Good- 
ness ; and the desire of it is a mode of Desire of Goodness. 
For example. Desire of Knowing must be distinguished from 
a desire of knoiuingness — from a desire to be a hioiving per- 
son. It is the impulse which moves young children to those 
perpetual questionings which so often tire the patience of 
parents and nurses. Sometimes it is called "curiosity," and 



38 THE HEART OF MAN. 

sometimes "inquisitiveness." When operating singly, it is a 
desire to know merely for the sake of knowing, and is associ- 
ated with no imagination of ulterior benefit. In like manner 
we are to distinguish Desire of Power from a desire of pow- 
erfulness as a trait of personality. When we are thinking of 
ourselves, and are conscious of craving power of body, of 
intellect, or of will, as an end, we are animated by Desire of 
Goodness. But when our characters are absent from our 
view, and we simply wish to exercise control in some partic- 
ular direction, or desire to gain a certain position, in order 
that we may dominate, being intent solely on the gratification 
associated in our conceptions with the exertion of force, we 
experience Desire of Power in its simplicity. 

Desire of Ownership so readily coincides with several 
other Primary Desires that it is found alone less frequently 
than some of the rest. Yet there can be no doubt of its 
separate existence in every human Heart. Say to a little 
boy that he may have a toy to play with whenever he likes, 
but that he must not call it his own, and he will be far from 
satisfied. If he has ever grasped the idea of possession, he 
will tell you "I want it for mine.". Any one, who will take 
the trouble of listening to children, will be struck with the 
peculiar emphasis with which they utter the words " my " and 
"mine," and with the fact that these are among their earliest 
utterances. And how shall we account for the conduct of 
the miser without recognizing Desire of Ownership as a sep- 
arate impulse ? He voluntarily forfeits all Favorable Re- 
gard, and refuses to use his wealth as a mean to Conscious- 
ness of Power. He subjects himself to manifold priva- 
tions, and denies himself all influence, in order that he may 



THE ACQUISITIVE SYSTEM. 39 

hoard money and think of it as his own. It is certain that 
Ownership is an end to him, and not a mean to anything 
beyond. 

It would be superfluous to prove the universality of Desire 
of Sympathy and Desire of Favorable Regard. Observation 
and Consciousness will furnish all who care to investigate 
such matters with abundant evidence. 

If the genesis of desires is such as I have described, it fol- 
lows that Desire of Goodness is entitled to a place among the 
primary and universal desires of mankind. We have seen 
that the Heart has an original Susceptibility of Pleasure in 
Consciousness of Goodness. Were it destitute of this, it 
would be incapable of self-complacency, in the proper sense 
of that 'term. But we know that such a capability is univer- 
sal and is evinced at a very early age. And pleasure having 
once become associated with personal excellence, whether of 
body, of intellect, or of heart, Acquisitivity inevitably reaches 
out after that Medium. With every new conception of a form 
of personal Goodness, a new object of desire comes before 
the Heart; and thus the sphere of Desire of Goodness is 
enlarged. 

When we seek to prove inductively the existence of this 
desire we are embarrassed by the fact, that Goodness, in 
numberless cases, soon comes to be regarded as a mean to 
the gratification of other desires. -This result is due prima- 
rily to the law which conditions genuine Happiness on 
excellence of personality. It becomes apparent that the fruit- 
fulness of all the Primary Media of Pleasure depends very 
largely on the worthiness of the individual. And the ordinary 
modes of parental training have a powerful tendency to 



40 THE HEART OF MAN. 

strengthen this conviction. All punishments are accompanied 
by charges of Badness, and all rewards by commendations for 
Goodness. Then children are told that, if they are good, 
they will be loved and esteemed, and they have pointed out 
to them the ways in which various excellences will work the 
gratification of their various Primary Desires. The result is, 
that Goodness ceases, in a measure, to be viewed as an end, 
and comes to be regarded habitually as a mean. Conse- 
quently, when we examine cases in which Goodness is desired, 
we may find many, in which it seems possible to trace the 
phenomenon to other primary impulses, before we fall upon 
one in which it is necessary to recognize a separate Desire of 
Goodness. This fact goes far to account for the overlooking 
of this impulse by many of the able investigators who have 
surveyed this section of the human Heart. 

Still, we need only to be thorough in our researches, in 
order to be convinced, a posteriori^ that Desire of Goodness 
has a right to the place which I have assigned it. Observe 
the children to whose minds Goodness has been carefully held 
up apart from its consequences. Listen to their words as they 
are giving expression to their anticipations. They will tell 
you that they are going to do so and so, and add, " Then I 
shall be good ; shan't I ? " Question them after the evening 
prayer, concerning their intentions for the morrow, and they 
will tell you that they are going to be good girls, or good 
boys, all day. It is evident that they are resting in the pros- 
pect of Goodness, without a thought of anything they are 
to gain by it. And the delightfulness of the anticipation 
proves the presence of Desire of Goodness ; for it is impos- 
sible to anticipate with pleasure the realization of that which 
is not craved. 



THE ACQUISITIVE SYSTEM. 41 

We see the presence of this desire indicated more plainly, 
perhaps, in association with conceptions of particular forms 
of Goodness. The old and the young alike wish to be beau- 
tiful, to be strong in body and in understanding, to be kind 
and truthful and courageous ; and, although it often appears 
that these qualities are desired for the sake of Favorable 
Regard, or of some other consequence, yet in many cases it is 
equally plain that they are desired for their ow^n sake. It 
may be remarked, also, that all persons, of every age, have an 
aversion to qualities which they consider bad, and desire to 
be free from them. Such freedom is desired on its own 
account ; and, though it is but a negative form of Goodness, 
it is plainly an object of the desire under discussion. 

It is proper to ask here why it is that we are ever at pains 
to justify our conduct and our characteristics to ourselves. 
We often do so without a thought of what we are to gain or 
to lose by them. At such times we are evidently striving for 
the pleasure of thinking well of ourselves. But, if we did not 
desire to be good, why should we care to think ourselves 
good ? One who does not crave riches, never seeks to per- 
suade himself that he is becoming rich ; and one, who has no 
thirst for fame or notoriety, never fights against the convic- 
tion that he is obscure. So, if we did not desire Goodness, 
we should never engage in solitary self-justification. I think 
every one is capable of an experiment by which this question 
can be settled conclusively. We can imagine ourselves 
outside the pale of moral government, where, as to the grati- 
fication of all other desires, it would be a matter of complete 
indifference whether we were good or bad. Now, supposing 
ourselves in that condition, would the prospect of becoming 



42 THE HEART OF MAN. 

mean, stingy, false-hearted and cowardly be as attractive as 
the prospect of possessing all noble and heroic characteris- 
tics ? No one can make this experiment in good faith and 
then doubt that he desires Goodness for its own sake. 

If these evidences could all be explained away, I should 
still maintain the primariness and universality of Desire of 
Goodness. I know, that by reason of an original Susceptibility, 
we take pleasure in Favorable Self-regard. I know, too, that 
Acquisitivity is a power of every human heart, spontaneously 
moving it to demand a repetition of every form of enjoyment 
which it has once experienced. Hence I should believe in the 
necessary origination of the desire in question, were I unable 
to discover a single instance in which I could assert positively 
that I had found it acting by itself. 

There are two highly important desires which differ from 
the other Primary Desires, as Perception of Goodness and 
Perception of Happiness differ from the other Intellective 
Causes of Pleasure. They demand the operation of their 
Primary Media neither within the conscious Mind nor toward 
the perceiving Mind. They simply call for the existence of 
those Media as objects of contemplation. But these Media 
are none the less fitted on this account to elicit the reaching 
forth of Aquisitivity. I have shown that the right of exclu- 
sive control does not belong to the essence of Ownership. It 
is equally apparent that exclusive enjoyment is not insepara- 
ble from that appropriation to which Acquisitivity impels. 
When I bring an object into such relation to myself, that it 
can operate through my Intellect to produce delight in my 
Heart, I acquire it; and such an acquisition is a triumph of 
desire. 



THE ACQUISITIVE SYSTEM. 43 

These two Primary Desires are evolved by the conjunction 
of Acquisitivity with Susceptibility to Perception of Good- 
ness, and with Susceptibility to Perception of Happiness; and 
I call them, respectively, Desire of Foreign Goodness and De- 
sire of Foreign Happiness. It seems unnecessary to occupy 
much space in adducing facts to prove that these desires, 
through constitutional necessity, make their appearance in 
every normally constituted human Heart. Every child that 
remembers the beauty of an unclouded sky, and the glistening 
of the sunshine on the tree-tops, desires those forms of Good- 
ness to reappear. When old enough to reflect on correctness 
of conduct, every child wishes to observe the signs of personal 
Goodness in its playmates. The preference of personal Good- 
ness to personal Badness in others is seldom entirely lost by 
anyone. Occasionally one may be found who has progressed 
so far in mental suicide that he would be glad to drag others 
down to his own level. He is pained by the comparisons to 
his own disadvantage which are continually forced upon him; 
-and the rage, engendered by Consciousness of Badness, im- 
pels him to seek relief in that way. But no thoughtful ob- 
server of men will believe that many persons have reached 
such a stage of depravity. On the other hand, we find many 
slaves of vice who sincerely and earnestly deprecate every 
step of another in the direction of their own moral state. As 
to the other desire, we may say that it is evinced habitually 
by every child, although it is sometimes overmastered tempo- 
rarily by such an antagonistic impulse as Resentment or inor- 
dinate Desire of Power. Very few, if any, persons ever be- 
come so foolishly selfish that, other things being equal, they 
would not prefer the happiness of their fellow-men to their 



44 THE HEART OF MAN. 

unhappiness, while, by a vast majority of human beings, that 
preference is manifested conspicuously, and under such cir- 
cumstances as to necessitate the conviction that Foreign Hap- 
piness is desired for its own sake. 

In these two impulses, differing so widely from the other 
Primary Desires as to the Media of Pleasure concerned in 
their evolution, we obtain our first view of the Heart's struc- 
tural provisions for human beneficence. Desire of Foreign 
Happiness is by far the most powerful of the forces which 
impel men to mitigate human distress, and to engage in enter- 
prises which have for their object the elevation of mankind. 
The co-operative beneficence of the two impulses is apparent 
when we consider that the end, toward which Desire of For- 
eign Goodness struggles, is an indispensable mean of human 
welfare. 

As the Original Susceptibilities turned out to be dual, 
each of them presenting a possibility of pain as well as of 
pleasure, I at first expected to discover a similar duality 
throughout the systems which constitute the Heart, and to 
find a set of repugnances, acting as separate impulses, over 
against the several Primary Desires. In that case it would 
have been necessary to adopt a compound name for the 
Acquisitive System. It is true that, while our thoughts are 
occupied with the opposite of any Primary Medium of 
Pleasure, we are conscious of an impulse to seek freedom 
from it. Yet, as that impulse serves only to re-enforce the 
desire of the Medium itself, it is not entitled to be classed as 
a primary spring of action. 



CHAPTER IV. 



THE REACTIVE SYSTEM. 



Among the actions of every child there are three partic- 
ularly noticeable movements: an eager grasping, an open- 
handed caressing and an angry striking. The grasping is 
obviously a sign of Desire. The caressing and striking 
remain to be explained. This brings us to the examination 
of what I call the Reactive System, and of the fifth Ele- 
mentary Power, to which I give the name Reactivity. This 
is the power which impels spontaneously to the reciprocation 
of pleasure and pain. By virtue of it the Mind spontane- 
ously reacts, for the production of pleasure, on the person or 
thing it regards as the cause of its pleasure, and for the 
production of pain on the person or thing that seems to have 
caused a painful emotion in itself. It is the common char- 
acteristic of all ajffections, and bears the same relation to 
these that Acquisitivity bears to the Desires. This funda- 
mental and obvious difference between desires and affections 
makes it a matter of astonishment to me that so many able 
psychologists have treated the two classes of phenomena as 
having the same genesis. 

The Primary Affections are Love and Resentment. Every 
spontaneous impulse to reciprocate pleasure is a form of the 
one ; and every spontaneous reaction of the Heart against 
pain is a form of the other. They are usually classed as, 



46 • THE HEABT OF MAN. 

respectively, Benevolent Affections, and Malevolent Affec- 
tions. 

There is one distinction in forms of Love which is 
familiar to every one. When the causative pleasure is 
awakened by the bestowment of a benefit, viewed as inten- 
tional, we call the affection Gratitude. When the pleasure 
to which Love responds originates in Perception of Good- 
ness, we call it Complacency. I see no better way than to 
adopt this latter name, though, in doing so, we must confine 
it rigidly to the disposition to confer, pleasure- in return for 
delight experienced in Perception of Goodness. But there is 
another form of Love, more frequently exhibited than either 
of these, which seems to be still in want of a specific name. 
I refer to the affection which centers upon objects because 
they have become pleasurable through intellective associa- 
tion. For example, I am conscious of a strong attachment to 
a person who has never entitled himself to my Gratitude and 
whose character is not fitted to awaken complacency. In 
seeking the origin of this affection I discover, in the first 
place, that he has had several interesting experiences in 
common with myself ; that 1 take it for granted that, in 
remembering those experiences, he has the same emotions 
with which I remember them, and hence that, whenever I 
think of him, I find pleasure in Perception of Sympathy. 
In the second place, I recollect that he has evinced a liking 
for me and thus contributed to my enjoyment through Per- 
ception of Favorable Hegard. I recall, also, several instances 
in which I have exerted myself for his welfare and thus made 
him an occasion of pleasure though self-approbation, or Con- 
sciousness of Goodness. I now see that all these delights, 



THE REACTIVE SYSTEM. 47 

blended in one, and dissevered from their causes, have 
become inseparably associated with my conception of that 
person, and that, consequently, the thought of him, whether 
present or absent, gives exercise to Reactivity. The form of 
the affection, here described, I call Associate Love. This, 
like many other names, which I have been compelled to 
introduce, fails to satisfy me entirely ; but I can think of no 
better one. The above explanation will, I trust, preclude any 
confusion which might otherwise result from the ambiguity 
of the expression. 

It is not often, perhaps, that one of these forms of Love 
exists for a long time apart from the others. Gratitude gives 
pleasure to the grateful Heart through Consciousness of 
Goodness ; and in. this way, if in no other, becomes combined 
with Associate Love. It also predisposes one to discover or 
to imagine, in its object, characteristics which may properly 
elicit Complacency. This latter effect is produced, also, by 
Associate Love. In its turn. Complacency, being itself de- 
lightful, is followed by an additional association of delight 
with the conception of the object toward which it is directed. 
Moreover, both Complacency and Associate Love predispose 
Intellect to ascribe intentional beneficence to their object, 
and thus to evoke, through Emotivity, an accession of Grati- 
tude. In a majority of cases, therefore, though one of the 
forms is usually far more conspicuous than either of the 
others, the affection is compounded of Gratitude, Compla- 
cency and Associate Love. While I see these wonderful 
interactions taking place, it would be hard to keep my pen 
from setting down an expression of admiration for the 
structural provisions whereby the dwelling of Love in the 



48 THE HEART OF MAN. 

human Heart is made sure, or from charging impudence 
upon the man who asks me to believe that all these mani- 
festations of a mental life complete in itself have their 
primary and sole origin in the gray matter of the brain, or 
in a " thread of Consciousness." 

With the facts now before us it becomes easy to account 
for any special affiection. Friendship, for instance, may have 
any one of the three forms of Love for its original and chief 
component. Sometimes it is, at first, a mutual complacency. 
In other cases it is originally, on the one side. Gratitude for 
benefits received, and, on the other. Associate Love called 
into being, through consciousness of Goodness and Perception 
of Happiness, in the bestowment of those benefits. More 
frequently, I think, it begins on both sides in Associate Love. 
This form of Love, too, is the chief element of affection for 
kindred, as distinguished from friendship. Here, however, 
the most important part is filled by an Intellective Cause of 
Pleasure which I have not yet mentioned in this connection. 
I refer to Consciousness of Ownership, and it was with an 
eye to its power in shaping the affections, that I spoke in a 
former chapter of the great importance of this cause. The 
ability to say of a person " He is my father," or " He is 
my son," often yields an intenser delight, and, therefore, 
causes a stronger movement of Reactivity than all other 
forces combined. This truth was dimly perceived by Stewart, 
when he said, " The parental affection takes its rise from a 
knowledge of the relation in which the parties stand." To 
the Consciousness of Ownership — of the ability to use the 
possessive pronouns of the first person — it is due that parents 
and children, brothers and sisters and more distant relatives 



TPIE REACTIVE SYSTEM. 49 

may have an ardent mutual affection, though they have had 
few experiences in common, and are indebted to each other 
for little pleasure through any of the other Intellective Causes. 
It is to this alone that we are to ascribe the difference 
between friendship and affection for kindred when the other 
causes of Complacency, Gratitude, and Associate Love have 
been equally operative in the two cases. 

It will at once occur to the thoughtful reader that Patriot- 
ism is, in the main, the response of the Heart to the pleasure 
received, in the contemplation of one's country, through Con-' 
sciousness of Ownership. To be sure. Complacency always 
enters into the aft'ection. The Love originated by the former 
Cause, determines Intellect to dwell upon all that is good, and 
to ignore all that is bad, in the territory and institutions of 
pne's country, and in the national characteristics of its inhabi- 
tants. The pleasure is intensified and Reactivity is stimu- 
lated by remembrance of all that was heroic in the achieve- 
ments of one's countrymen in past generations. Intellect is 
moved, likewise, to occupy itself with the personal advantages 
for which one is indebtecj to one's country ; and thus Grati- 
tude, also, is brought to the support of Associate Love. Still, 
a man loves his country primarily because it is his country. 
But for Consciousness of Ownership there would be no such 
distinct affection as patriotism in the world. Similar remarks 
are applicable to Love of Party. This affection, having once 
originated in Consciousness of Ownership, disposes one to 
keep in view what one believes to be good in the history, 
characteristics, measures and principles of one's party, and 
thus goes into combination with Complacency. The disposi- 
tion to magnify all that can be made to seem good, and to 
4 



50 THE HEART OF MAN. 

shut all that is evil from view, often becomes very strong 
through the vehement exercise called forth by opposition ; 
and Associate Love receives additional fervor from the pleas- 
ure produced by Consciousness of Power in the anticipation 
of party triumph. 

It may seem, at the first glance, that there are some affec- 
tions which cannot be accounted for on this theury. For 
example, one may say, " Here is a man laboring for the wel- 
fare of a class of vicious persons. He evidently loves them. 
Yet he has never had any relations to them which could give 
rise to Associate Love ; there is nothing in their characters 
to evoke complacency ; certainly they have never earned his 
gratitude. How comes it about, then, that he loves them ? " 
In answer to such an inquirer I would call attention to the 
distinction between Desire and Affection. There is peculiar 
danger of confusion at this point, since the movement of 
Reactivity, originated by pleasure, coincides precisely with 
Desire of Foreign Happiness. These two distinct provisions 
for human beneficence belong to the structure of every human 
Heart. But is it not plain that, in the case above instanced, 
the benefactor was moved at the outset by Desire of Foreign 
Happiness and Desire of Foreign Goodness ? It is probable 
that now those impulses have been reinforced by some meas- 
ure of affection. His labors have yielded him pleasure in 
Consciousness of Goodness. It may be, too, that he has found 
gratification in Perception of Favorable Regard and in Con- 
sciousness of Power. We can easily see, therefore, how 
Associate Love may have been generated since those Desires 
became operative. Moreover, in most cases of this kind, it 
will be found that the attention of the philanthropist has 



thp: reactive system. 51 

fixed itself on some good quality — some redeeming trait — 
in the characters of those for whom he is laboring, and, there- 
fore, that complacency is not wholly wanting. It may be 
well here to emphasize the truth that simple benevolence, 
such as we feel toward mankind at large, is not an affection. 
It is neither more nor less than Desire of Foreign Happiness. 

There is one singularly complex phenomenon to the origi- 
nation of which all the Elementary Powers contribute. It is 
Pity, and the analysis of it is not difficult now that we know 
what our Elementary Powers really are. Mental Sense re- 
ceives an impression which Intellect interprets as a sign of 
suffering. This interpretation causes pain though Suscepti- 
bility to Perception of Unhappiness. The influence of this 
pain, extending to the Acquisitive System, stimulates Desire of 
Foreign Happiness to set the intellective faculties at devising 
means of relief. Then a pleasant emotion is awakened through 
Consciousness of Goodness ; and, finally, this pleasure is 
associated with the person pitied, and Reactivity yields Asso- 
ciate Love. If the Pity is prolonged, the affection is strength- 
ened in various ways which it is unnecessary to specify. 

Love is often combined with a desire for the presence of 
its object, and is sometimes viewed as including it. But this 
craving is no part of the affection itself. Enjoyment having 
become associated with the presence of the object of Love, 
Desire of Pleasure accounts for all the rest. We long to be 
at home because it is associated in our conceptions with de- 
light, and we desire to be delighted. For the same reason, 
the devout person is attached to his accustomed place of wor- 
ship, and all persons desire to revisit the spots where they 
have experienced great pleasure. 



52 THE HEART OF MAN. 

It is true, indeed, that we do sometimes love^ in the strictest 
sense of the term, persons, places and things that we are un- 
able to benefit. But this by no means disproves our theory. 
The impulse to reciprocate the pleasure received from them 
still remains. The force of Reactivity in such cases is often 
sufficient to produce a momentary illusion in the most clear- 
sighted intellect. We find ourselves thanking and blessing 
the writers and doers of former ages in return for the delight 
which their works and deeds have given us. We feel that we 
must, in some way, gladden them with a knowledge of our 
appreciation. Who has not found himself caressing a tree, 
or stretching out his hands to his native hills, with the same 
feeling that accompanies the reciprocation of pleasure ? Who 
has not pronounced benedictions on the landscape that was 
filling him with joy ? In fact, I believe that the force of Re- 
activity is most fully brought to light in some of those cases 
in which the bestowment of benefit is impossible. What is 
the meaning of adoration, if the Heart has no impulse to re- 
act, for the bestowment of blessedness, toward One whose 
blessedness cannot be increased ? There is no anomaly here, 
nor is any blunder of creative power indicated by these 
things ; for, in this part of its functions. Reactivity sheds 
back upon the Heart the benefits which it is unable to com- 
municate. 

I see no reason to dwell at length on Resentment. Its 
uses and possible perversions, as well as those of Love, and of 
all the Primary Desires, afford a most inviting field for inves- 
tigation. But my present aim is simply to point out what I 
find in the human Heart ; and I desire to make this discussion 
as brief as possible. The forms and manifestations of Re- 



THE REACTIVE SYSTEM. 53 

sentment are the opposites of those of Love. Opposed to 
Gratitude we have Revenge ; opposed to Complacency we 
have Indignation, and opposed to Associate Love we have 
Associate Hatred. The Geneses of the forms of Resentment 
take place according to the same laws under which the forms 
of Love are originated ; and there are similar comminglings, 
resulting in peculiar exhibitions of ill-will. As pleasure 
operates on the one side, so pain operates on the other. 

One statement has been repeated by so many writers that 
it ought to be corrected. I mean the assertion that Resent- 
ment is invariably painful. To be sure, it always originates 
in pain, and while the facts which occasioned it are kept in 
view, a degree of pain must continue to be felt. But these 
things do not prove that the affection is at all times, on the 
whole, a painful one. Among savages it is even a proverb 
that " Revenge is sweet ; " and, where the passion is univer- 
sally regarded as a virtue, we can readily believe that this is 
true. In Christian lands, of course, the case is different. 
Here every one understands that deliberate Revenge, operat- 
ing singly, is evil, and consequently it must come in conflict 
with Desire of Goodness as well as with Desire of Foreign 
Happiness. Every one believes, also, that it is against his 
own welfare to cherish an evil affection, and, hence, a struggle 
arises between Revenge and Desire of Happiness. Envy and 
jealousy must always be painful, because they are obviously 
perversions of Resentment. But this is far from being true 
of just Indignation. I hold that when a disposition to favor 
the infliction of punishment has been aroused by a gross 
manifestation of badness, and is, therefore, in accord with 
Desire of Goodness, and when the Happiness of the offender 



54 THE HEART OF MAN. 

is duly subordinated by Intellect to the welfare of society and 
Desire of Foreign Happiness is thus brought into co-opera- 
tion, and when the disposition is not thwarted by the hinder- 
ance of justice, the pleasure experienced far exceeds' the pain 
that enters into the state of mind. I remember a Sabbath 
morning on which it was announced that one, believed to be 
a great criminal and responsible for incalculable distress, had 
been arrested ; and I can recall few occasions on which I have 
witnessed equal manifestations of popular joy. Yet Resent- 
ment was the one impulse which predominated over all others 
when that man was the object of thought. It seems to me 
unquestionable that the legitimate working of Reactivity in 
the direction of pain is designed to increase the sum of our 
enjoyments. 



CHAPTER Y. 



VOLITIONS. 



We have traced the geneses of Emotions, Desires and 
Affections, and have seen how numberless motives to exertion 
come into being. We have yet to observe the processes 
through which these springs of action become effective. We 
must see them at their work; and, in order to make my 
demonstration clear, I find it necessary once more to enlarge 
my nomenclature. Desires and Affections, both primary and 
specific, considered as operating forces, I call Impellents ; 
and I shall have occasion to apply the name "Impulse" to 
the force resultant from the conjunction of any two, or more, 
of these impellents, though I shall continue sometimes to use 
it in its ordinary sense. The connection, I hope, will show 
with sufficient clearness what I mean by the word. 

That which takes place just before an impulse operates on 
Intellect and sets it in motion, is one of the most conspicuous 
manifestations of mental life. Its well-known name is ''A 
Volition ; " and my definition of it is this : A volition is the 
rise of an impulse to operativeness. That impulse may be a 
a single impellent, primary or specific ; or it may be the 
resultant of several impellents co-operating, or conflicting. 
In either case I think it clear that its rise to operativeness 
does not presuppose the activity of an original faculty distinct 
from the Elementary Powers already examined. 

In the present state of opinion on this subject I feel myself 



56 THE HEART OF MAN. 

called upon to occupy some space in defending the position 
just stated. Most persons ascribe volitions to what they call 
" The Will," and treat this as a distinct and underived faculty 
of supreme importance. As President Hopkins says : " By 
some, by most indeed, this element of will is supposed to be 
the chief one in personality, and there are those who regard 
it as the only one." It may be expected that those who share 
this view will be indisposed to acquiesce in the conclusion 
that all volitions can be traced to the interactions of the 
Powers which I have described. Yet with all deference I am 
prepared to affirm that I neither feel the need nor am able to 
discover the existence of a separate faculty possessing the 
attributes usually ascribed to the Will. My view is that all 
the striking phenomena, connected with volition, originate in 
movements of the impellents preliminary to contact with the 
executive powers of Intellect. They result from the more or 
less obstructed operation of Acquisitivity and Reactivity 
toward Intellect. Nor do I see any reason for interposing a 
separate faculty between the two former and the last, which 
would not equally call for such an interposition between any 
two of the Elementary Powers, in order to account for the 
effect of the one upon the other. Take an illustration. Intel- 
lect assumes the form of Consciousness of Knowing, and thus 
excites pleasure in the Emotive System. Emotivity now acts 
upon the Acquisitive System, and produces Desire of Knowing. 
By the occurrence of a problem this primary desire becomes 
specific : I desire to know the true solution of the problem ; 
and instantly this specific desire acts upon Intellect and turns 
it into the mode of investigation. I am voluntarily concentrat- 
• ing my thoughts and endeavoring to unearth the truth buried 



VOLITIONS. 57 

in that problem. Now, how can it be made to appear that in 
this case the desire does not affect the intellective movement 
as immediately as Consciousness of Knowing acts on Emo- 
tivity ? 

It is true that we are often more vividly conscious of the 
contact of Acquisitivity or Reactivity with Intellect, than we 
are of the previous operations of the Elementary Powers on 
each other. This is not true in every case. In the one just 
instanced, and in a thousand others which might be adduced, 
the last conjunction attracts no more attention than is given 
to any one of those which precede it. And we can easily ex- 
plain why it is ever otherwise. The final contact of the 
impellents with the executive powers of Intellect is often the 
result of a protracted struggle. The Mind is conscious of a 
number of discordant impulses, no one of which is enough 
stronger than the others to gain an immediate victory. A 
period of hesitation and wavering ensues. In the meantime. 
Intellect is engaged in comparing, imagining and making 
various other movements, all of which announce themselves 
in Consciousness. Finally, the judgment, " This is best," is 
pronounced, and simultaneously the resultant impulse becomes 
operative. In this way the rise of what we call voluntary ac- 
tion becomes a conspicuous object of attention ; and the con- 
tact, which is its immediate origin, is strikingly distinguished 
from the preceding ones. It is probable that this vividness of 
consciousness, in connection with volitions, is one of the chief 
reasons why men are so strongly disposed to ascribe them to 
an independent faculty. The phenomena are very conspicu- 
ous, and one naturally desires to account for them. In such 
cases the shortest way to dispose of a troublesome question is 



58 THE HEART OF MAN. 

to assume that an original faculty has been implanted for the 
special purpose of yielding the results under consideration. 

Another circumstance, which draws attention to the last 
step in the origination of activity in the executive powers, and 
heightens the estimate of its relative importance, is the ap- 
pearance of its decisiveness in regard to conduct. The voli- 
tion, being immediately connected with the act, is regarded as 
its sole cause. This conclusion results from a hasty suspension 
of investigation. When we look farther back we discover 
other decisive moments at earlier stages "of the process. In 
the case supposed above, if Consciousness of Knowing had 
produced but a slight effect in the Emotivt; System, the ac- 
quisitive impulse would have been too feeble to move Intellect 
to the solution of the problem. Again, though Desire of 
Knowing had been strong, had Acquisitivity, at the same 
time, been excited still more powerfully through some other 
cause, the latter impulse would have controlled the Intellec- 
tive movement, and there would have been no attempt to solve 
the problem. We see, therefore, that the contacts of Intellect 
with Emotivity and of the latter with Acquisitivity were 
quite as decisive as to the volition itself as the latter was in 
regard to the subsequent act. This conclusion is amply justi- 
fied by observation. We know that a person, in whom Desire 
of Knowing is strong, habitually sets himself about the solu- 
tion of problems which have no attraction for one in whom 
that desire is weak. We know, too, that the one who has the 
desire in great strength experiences incomparably more pleas- 
ure than the other in Consciousness of Knowing ; and this 
greater pleasure obviously accounts for the greater strength 
of the desire. 



VOLITIONS. 59 

A difficulty may be suggested here in connection with the 
fact, that the volition is not always followed immediately by 
the corresponding action. I may will to do a thing at a future 
time. In this case there is evidently a volition, which takes 
the form of a purpose, though there is yet no contact with 
the executive powers. Still, so far as the mental state is con- 
cerned, the preparation for that contact is complete. The 
impulse, too, may properly be called " operative," because it 
has gained predominance over all opposing impulses, and only 
awaits the passing of obstructions in order to exert its power. 
For its preservation in that state there is need only of that 
general power of the Mind to retain its tendencies, which is 
one of the indispensable provisions for the continued exis- 
tence of the Mind as an organized entity. Nor is there 
anything singular in the pause which precedes the contact of 
the operative impulse with Intellect. Similar pauses often 
take place before other operations of Elementary Powers on 
each other. Take three cases. Ten years ago. Desire of 
Knowing became specific, and rose to the state of an operative 
impulse to investigate a certain subject. It was necessary to 
defer the investigation ; but today I apprehend a favorable 
opportunity, and the operative impulse sets my faculties at 
work. Ten years ago, I saw a picture which gave me intense 
delight through Susceptibility to Perception of Goodness. I 
had not the faintest desire to possess that picture, because I 
supposed its acquisition impossible. Today, I apprehend the 
truth that I can make the picture mine, and am immediately 
conscious of desiring it most intensely. Ten years ago, I saw 
a person in great distress, on account of the act of another. I 
felt no resentment, however, because I considered the act 



60 THE HEART OF MAN. 

accidental. Today, I apprehend the truth that the injury was 
inflicted wilfully ; and I am possessed at once with vehement 
indignation. In each of these cases an intellective apprehen- 
sion breaks up a pause of ten years' duration ; and I see no 
more need of an intermediate faculty in the first case than in 
the others. To all such transitions of vital force from one 
System to another, there are indispensable conditions, which, 
if not present, must be awaited. 

" But," it may be asked, " does not Consciousness, after 
all, testify to the existence of an independent Will ? Is there 
not something in the consciousness of a purpose which can- 
not be produced by the process described ? When I say, I 
will do this, have I not a feeling which must have come from 
some other source?" In answer to such questions, I would 
say, in the first place, that Consciousness alone delivers no 
testimony concerning the sources from which our feelings 
spring. It busies itself exclusively with the processes of the 
moment, and discloses absolutely nothing as to their origins. 
It is equally plain that Consciousness presents no analysis of 
a feeling* compounded of several elements. It merely pro- 
vides material for the exercise of analytic power ; and the 
Consciousness of a feeling, which it is exceedingly difficult to 
resolve into its component elements, is a matter of hourly 
experience. Several emotions, entirely distinct from each 
other in their origins, are blended in one ; and the compound 
is widely different from any one of the components. The 
peculiar consciousness, resulting from such a combination, 
can be known only by its actual presence in the Mind. With- 
out previous experience in that very matter, and a perfect 
analysis of that very mental state, and a tracing of each com- 



VOLITIONS. 61 

ponent emotion to its source, it is impossible to say that the 
blending of certain specified mental processes would, or would 
not, produce a given effect in Consciousness. Hence, the 
feeling which we have when we say " I vylll do this," neither 
affords any evidence concerning its own origin, nor proves 
the impossibility of its origination in the manner I have 
traced. 

Let us glance again at what is involved in the rise of an 
impulse to operativeness. It is unnecessary to dwell on the 
case of a volition preceded by no conflict, and immediately 
going into effect. Of such a process, as I have said, the 
consciousness is no more vivid than that of any other opera- 
tion of one Elementary Power on another. But what takes 
place when there is a struggle? There is a comparison of 
the objects toward which the several impellents are pressing. 
Imagination places us successively in possession of each. 
The cost at which each is attainable is considered. Finally, 
a conception of the acquisition and possession of one of the 
objects yields intenser pleasure in the Emotive System, than 
is wrought by that of the acquisition and possession of any of 
the others. In its turn Emotivity operates simultaneously on 
Intellect and Acquisitivity. Intellect judges decisively and, 
at the same instant, the corresponding impulse leaps to opera- 
tiveness. Here we have a judgment, constituting the intel- 
lective element of choice. We have, also, an anticipation, 
in which Imagination grasps the completion of the chosen 
course of action, and sheds on Emotivity a foretaste of tri- 
umph. There is a victorious impulse. There is likewise a 
Consciousness of Power, to which both the victory of the 
impulse and the anticipation of success contribute. More- 



62 THE HEART OF MATs^. 

over, when the operative impulse is made vehement by the 
prospect of obstacles to be overcome, the intuitive Sense of 
Personalty is excited to extreme vividness. All these ele- 
ments enter into the mental state ; and who is prepared to 
say that such a blending cannot produce the feeling of which 
we are conscious at the moment of volition, or when a 
purpose is engaging our thoughts? 

Perhaps I ought to give one or two illustrations of the 
method adopted to prove that a desire cannot cause a voli- 
tion. Locke, as approvingly quoted by Stewart, says: "A 
man whom I cannot deny may oblige me to use persuasions 
to another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I may 
wish not to prevail on him. In this case it is plain that the 
will and desire run counter. I will the action that tends one 
way, whilst my desire tends another, and that the direct 
contrary." Here it is assumed that a person can have only 
one desire at a time. But every man's hourly experience of 
conflicting desires proves the assumption false. It is true 
that, in the case above instanced, there is one desire which 
opposes the voluntary action ; but is it not clear that there is 
another — the desire to accede to the wish of the one who 
requires the action — and that this desire is triumphant in 
the volition which precedes the use of persuasion? In every 
case, where there is manifestly a motive which tends to 
prevent what is done, there is quite as manifestly a stronger 
motive which tends to promote it. Prof. Haven says : " We 
often wish or desire what we do not will. The object of our 
desires may not be within the sphere of our volitions, may not 
be possible of attainment, may not depend, in any sense, on 
our wills. Or it may be something which reason and the law 



VOLITIONS. 63 

of right forbid, yet, nevertheless, an object of natural desire." 
All this is very true, but it proves only that there are some 
desires which do not bear fruit in volition, not, by any 
means, that a volition ever takes place without an impulse in 
harmony with it, or that it presupposes the existence of a 
separate faculty. All such allegations as I have quoted are 
perfectly consistent with my definition of a volition. 

As a matter of literary convenience, it is well to have 
such a substantive as " Will," and to understand by it the 
Mind's capacity to experience volitions. For obvious reasons 
there is more need of such a name at this point of vital ac- 
tivity, than there is of one to designate the Mind's capacity 
to experience a transition of vital force from the Emotive Sys- 
tem to the Acquisitive System. We should always bear in 
mind, however, that when we are speaking of " The Will " as 
determining intellective or corporeal exertion, we are speak- 
ing figuratively, and picturing it as controlling the forces of 
which it is only a passive medium. 

My reading in this line has not been extensive, but I under- 
stand that, among theologians of a certain school, many emi- 
nent and able men maintain that no explanation of volitions 
is possible, beyond the ascription of them to a central Will — 
" self -moved, self-directed." If any man can fix his attention 
on a human faculty, and really believe it capable of moving 
without an impelling force, he has a power of which I am 
glad to know myself destitute. I have no desire to divest 
myself for one moment of that Intuition of Causation, with- 
out an assumption of whose veracity it is impossible to write 
a single sentence containing a transitive verb. Aside from this 
consideration, in view of the unquestionable facts, which stand 



64 THE HEART OF MAN. 

out in blazing light all around us, it seems to me absolutely 
wonderful that any thinker should hold to the doctrine that 
volitions are independent of desire and affection, instead of 
being their consequences. Everybody constantly and inevita- 
bly assumes the contrary. All confidence in men and all 
distrust of them are based upon the assumption that their 
voluntary actions result from their habitual motives. If we 
know what a man's ruling passion is, we predict unhesitat- 
ingly what his conduct will be when an opportunity for the 
gratification of that passion shall be presented. Again, we in- 
variably assume that the impellents are causes of volition when- 
ever we attempt to influence a person to act, or to refrain from 
acting. No one ever dreamed of a direct address to the will. 
We address the intellect, hoping through this to awaken cer- 
tain emotions, and thus to produce in the impulsive systems 
such effects as will secure the volitions we desire. We often 
ask ourselves, " Why did I do that?" and, if the act in ques- 
tion was a recent one, we have no difiSculty in pointing out 
the motive or motives from which it sprung. When a man 
endeavors to explain or palliate his conduct, he tries to show 
that his volitions were caused by impellents less unworthy 
than those to which they might be attributed. 

If an appeal to Consciousness is made, I profess my readi- 
ness to appear before that tribunal at any moment. I shall 
insist, however, upon a true statement of the deliverances of 
Consciousness; for nothing is more common than a misinter- 
pretation of them .when an attempt is made to clothe them in 
language. If Consciousness is said to testify that our voli- 
tions are uncaused, the only proper attitude is that of President 
McCosh: "A .direct contradiction," I cannot say with that 



VOLITIONS. 65 

very able thinker, to whom the present generation is, and future 
generations will be, so largely indebted, that " This is a subject 
on which Consciousness, considered in itself, says nothing, 
and can say nothing." On the contrary I am sure that I am 
often conscious of the causation of volitions. I believe that 
this is always the case when one of my impulses rises to pre- 
dominance over opposing impulses. I am then conscious of 
the exercise of controlling power by that impulse; and that 
exercise is neither more nor less than causation. 

If I am asked, " Does not Consciousness testify that we 
are free agents ? " I answer Yes ; and I accept that testimony 
without a shadow of reservation. But let us try to get a dis- 
tinct view of this Consciousness of Freedom. What is it ? 
It is simply one of the forms of Consciousness of Power. 
It takes its peculiar cast from a conviction of the absence of 
restraint. My consciousness tells me that no earthly power 
can hinder me from resolving on any line of action on which 
I may choose to resolve. But no man's consciousness ever 
testified that he could come to a resolution in opposition to 
his own strongest impulses. When I say, " I can will to go, 
or will to stay, just as I choose^" I tell the exact truth ; and 
I may, or may not, forget that there are impellents within me 
now, determining my choice as surely as any effect ever fol- 
lowed its cause. The freedom of which we are conscious is 
the freedom of our volitional power from external restraint — 
the freedom of the human soul to will and to do according to 
its own prevailing impulses. But if we are conscious of this 
freedom from external restraint, are we not sometimes equally 
conscious of the internal enslavement of our volitional power? 
There are myriads of men who are saying today, " I cannot 



66 THE HEART OF MAN. 

make up my mind to take that step ; I wish I could ; I know 
I ought to do so ; I know it would be best for me, but some- 
how I cannot bring myself up to such a decision." The pain 
with which this confession is made is due to Consciousness of 
Weakness in volitional power and reveals the dependence of 
that power on the forces which lie back of it. Here, as every- 
where else, the affirmations of Consciousness, truly interpreted, 
are in perfect accord with conclusions from accurate observa- 
tion and just induction. 

I suppose the idea of a " Will self -moved, self-directed " 
has been caught up, on account of very unnecessary fidgeting 
about the fact of responsibility. But what is gained by such 
an expedient ? Will anyone maintain that the Will is self- 
created, or that we had a hand, before we were born, in deter- 
mining what the habits of our wills should be ? The fact 
itself of responsibility is an indubitable and a stupendous 
reality, of which we see evidences everywhere, within us and 
without us. I find only silliness in any attempt, by raising 
metaphysical difficulties, to dodge that reality or shut it out 
of sight, when we all know that there is no possibility of 
evading the punitive consequences of anything that is evil 
in our mental State or external conduct. But I attach re- 
sponsibility to the entire mental nature, and to every part of 
it. Though evil at one point is far worse, both in itself and 
in its consequences, than evil at another point, yet the law, 
that badness shall yield suffering^ bears upon every power and 
upon every process belonging to mental life. 

I am not in sympathy with those who seem nervously 
anxious to clear up the credit of the Supreme Mind ; for I 
know with a perfect knowledge that the Order of the Uni- 



YOLITIOKS. 67 

verse is as it should be. While there are a thousand things 
in it which I shall not understand very soon, I remember 
that darkness has its uses as well as light. It is true that 
when we look into the human Mind, so beautifully organized 
for the evolution of Goodness and for the origination and 
diffusion of Happiness, we find it in sad disorder, — 

" Like sweet bells jangled, out of tune and harsh." 

It has seemed good that we should begin our careers at a 
stage where mental disharmony is causing manifold and 
multitudinous signs of badness and distress to emerge ; and 
I can say, in all sincerity, that I am glad my initial lot has 
been cast just here. It is probable that, if we ever become 
able to measure the value of an enduring possibility of curing 
ills, rectifying wrongs and struggling upward, the existence 
of Evil will not then appear very mysterious. 



CHAPTER YL 



MORAL SENTIMENTS. 



A Sentiment, as I use the word, is a phenomenon to 
which both the Intellective System and the Heart contribute 
elements. It always contains a conviction and an emotion, 
and sometimes an impulse. I give the same meaning to the 
word " Sense " when I use it in naming a Moral Sentiment. 
These definitions make it evident that I do not regard any of 
the Moral Sentiments as un derived or simple. But -this fact 
does not derogate from my estimation of their originality 
and supreme importance. On the contrary, it may serve to 
elevate our conception of their dignity. We must remember 
that a Mind, at its first self-manifestation in the human child, 
has not fully emerged from the embryonic state, and that 
each stage necessarily reached in normal development marks 
a nearer approach to completeness than is indicated by any 
of the preceding stages. Consequently, the highest attri- 
butes are the latest in emerging. Indeed, at whatever point 
in healthful and continuous mental growth we look, we find 
the latest manifestation of mental life indicating more clearly 
than any that have gone before it the measureless distance 
between the level of man and that of the lower animals. I 
now proceed to the examination of the most important Moral 
Sentiments. 

1. The Oritical Sentiment, 

In contemplating the actions and dispositions of our 



MORAL SENTIMENTS. 69 

fellow-men we decide that they are good or bad, and ex- 
perience, accordingly, either pleasure or pain. The emotional 
part of this sentiment obviously springs from Susceptibility 
to Perception of Goodness and Perception of Badness. The 
intellective conviction, however, demands a brief discussion. 

I am in accord with those who ascribe all convictions, 
whatever their subject matter, to the Intellective System. I 
find no such elementary power as '' Moral Reason," but believe 
the use of such an expression to have a very misleading ten- 
dency. It produces the conception of a separate and unerring 
faculty for the discovery of moral qualities. While it is true 
that the activity of Intellect is a necessary condition of each 
Moral Sentiment, that Power operates on matters of morality 
under the same laws which govern its action when it is 
engaged on other subjects ; it acquires no additional efficiency 
when it enters the moral realm ; nor is it any nearer to infal- 
libility in one department of activity than in another, when 
neither the affirmations of Consciousness nor those of the 
Intuitive Faculty are involved. It would seem to me quite as 
proper to speak of a Political Reason, or a Scientific Reason, 
as to recognize the existence of a Moral Reason. I have 
thought, sometimes, however, that an exhaustive exploration 
of the Intellective System would disclose a Faculty which 
would be fitly called the Critical Faculty, always busying 
itself with the Susceptibilities, interpreting their contents, 
conducting their education, and receiving education from 
them. Such a faculty would have a relation to the Emotive 
System similar to that of the Perceptive Faculty to the 
Sensory System, and would have within its province all mat- 
ters of taste, as well as all moral distinctions. 



70 THE HEART OF MAN. 

It may be best to say a word on some cavilings concern- 
ing this subject, although they seem almost too puerile to 
deserve notice. Men have dwelt on the opposite views which 
have prevailed in different ages, and among different nations, 
concerning the rightness and wrongness of particular acts and 
customs, and have argued from these disagreements that our 
moral nature is an empty figment. No attempt at reasoning 
was ever more inconsequential. It would be quite as rational 
to infer, from the opposing scientific theories which have been 
held, that man has no capacity for science. As I have here- 
tofore shown, in all judgments, respecting goodness or 
badness, qualities are first discovered by Intellect ; Emotivity 
applies the standard of pain or pleasure, and, in accordance 
with the issue of this trial. Intellect, with or without delibera- 
tion, classes the qualities as good or bad. If more remains 
to be discovered, and attention is still fixed on the same 
object, new apprehensions cause new results in the Emotive 
System, and the classification of the qualities is correspond- 
ingly modified. The process is one and the same, whether 
the discrimination concerns morality, or has not the slightest 
relation to it. Diversities in Moral Judgment prove only 
that the Critical Faculty of one person has been more highly 
educated than that of another. 

I call attention here to a law which holds good in the 
origination of all Moral Sentiments. It is analogous to that 
noted and benign principle of the English Common Law, 
according to which "Every man is presumed to be innocent 
until he is proved to be guilty" — a principle which it would 
be well for us to observe in all our judgments concerning our 
fellow-men. We are under a structural necessity to observe it 



MORAL SENTIMENTS. 71 

in our judgments concerning ourselves. We necessarily pre- 
sume that our emotions, impulses, volitions and actions are 
good until we are brought to see that they are bad. Con- 
sequently, our convictions as to the goodness or badness of 
that which we observe are, in the first instance, always in har- 
mony with the emotions awakened by the observation, 
although a severe discipline of the Susceptibilities is often 
necessary, in order that new apprehensions may have their 
due effect in the Emotive System. We ascribe goodness to 
that which gives us pleasure, and badness to that which gives 
us pain, until it is proved to us that our emotions are unjusti- 
fiable. It is convenient to have a specific name for this law, 
and I call it the Law of Favorable Presumption. When the 
convictions, produced under it, are necessary and indestruc- 
tible, they have all the dignity and are entitled to all the 
authority of intuitions. 

The growth of our power to discern between good and 
evil depends immensely, of course, on circumstances ; but, in 
every normally constituted mind, it must go forward for a 
period at some pace, and result in the recognition of many 
forms of goodness. Some of these forms ?.re self -authenti- 
cating, and we can give no account of our favorable judgment 
on them beyond saying that we class them as good by reason 
of structural necessity. This is largely true, I think, as to 
physical beauty. We are so constituted that certain Sensory 
impressions, of which Intellect ascribes the origination to 
certain natural objects, excite pleasure in our Emotive System, 
and the intellective classification of those objects as good is 
a necessary consequence. A similar classification of corporeal 
strength and agility is provided for in Susceptibility to Con- 



72 THE HEA.RT OF MAN. 

sciousness of Power; and chiefly to the same origin we ascribe 
the universal conviction of the goodness of quickness of per- 
ception, tenacity of memory, shrewdness in planning and 
efliciency in expressing thought. Passing to qualities of the 
Heart, we see at once that a favorable judgment upon Benevo- 
lence is inevitable to the human mind. That judgment is 
necessitated by the reaction upon Intellect of Susceptibility 
to Perception of Happiness, because, as soon as the relation 
of cause and effect can be apprehended. Benevolence becomes 
inseparably associated in the youngMind with the production 
of pleasure. In this, as in all other critical judgments, the 
conviction is greatly strengthened by the activity of imagina- 
tion ; the perceiver places himself in the position of the one 
toward whom a benevolent disposition, or its opposite, is mani- 
fested and shares the pleasure or pain which it tends to pro- 
duce. Thus the conviction of the goodness of benevolence, 
and of the badness of its opposite, becomes as profound and 
indestructible as any conviction of which the human Mind is 
capable. The excellence of Courage also, is sure to be per- 
ceived whenever an exhibition of it is contemplated. Imagi- 
nation, for the moment, places the observing Mind in posses- 
sion of that quality ; and Consciousness of Power bears fruit 
at once in a favorable judgment. 

A general conviction of the excellence of Purity seems to 
presuppose a considerable advancement in civilization. One 
of the most wonderful of all historical events was the pro- 
mulgation of a ceremonial law having for a chief distinctive 
feature the education of a race of men to an appreciation of 
mental purity ; and there are those who believe that the 
civilized world is, today, largely indebted to that ceremonial 



MORAL SENTIMENTS. 73 

law and the educational efficacy realized in it ages ago for its 
deep conviction of the matchless worth of this virtue. The 
requisite stage of advancement being pre-supposed, the idea 
of purity is probably transferred from matter to Mind. Then 
it addresses the Emotive System through Perception of Good- 
ness, calling in the testimony of no other Susceptibility, but 
simply asserting its own superlative excellence. It is an 
indispensable element of that form of Goodness which we 
know as beauty ; and the Mind which apprehends it must 
commend it. 

"We needs must love the highest when we see it." 
I think no one will deny that men universally recognize 
the Goodness of Rectitude, or the purpose to do right. It is 
proper, however, to attempt the clearing away of obscurity at 
this point. In consequence of the tendency of moralists to 
dwell on external acts rather than on springs of action, they 
have employed the terms " Right " and " Wrong " far more 
frequently than " Good " and " Bad." They use them, too, as 
adjectives, as adverbs and as substantives ; and no little con- 
fusion has arisen from this practice. I think it would be 
better to denominate the qualities of which these words are 
descriptive, " Rightness " and " Wrongness." Still an am- 
biguity would remain. At one time we say an act is right 
because it is suitable to a relation ; at another, because it is 
in accordance with an obligation. Often er still these two 
reasons co-exist in our minds, sometimes the one, and some- 
times the other, being uppermost. The two senses easily 
glide into each other since what is morally suitable is like- 
wise incumbent as a duty. But the chief error consists in 
the ascription to rightness of a disproportionate importance. 



74 THE HEART OF MAN. 

It has often been aiaintained and still oftener assumed that 
this is the only quality with which morality has to do. In 
opposition to this view I hold that, whether we use the word 
"right" to express the idea of fitness, or that of consonance 
with obligation, we simply describe one of the forms of 
goodness, as we do, also, when we speak of an act as beautiful, 
or noble, or magnanimous, or sublime. Indeed, I am pre- 
pared to go farther than this and to say that rightness, 
conceived as the performance of duty, is a lower form of 
excellence than that of which any one of those epithets is 
descriptive. It is easy, however, to explain why " The 
Right" has received such prominence in works on moral 
philosophy. The fact of obligation is the one which first 
confronts us when moral improvement is under consideration. 
In a disordered soul, loyalty to obligation must precede spon- 
taneous goodness. But thinkers have erred in not going- 
back of this to discover the origin of Sense of Obligation, or 
forward of it to seek after the end toward which that prin- 
ciple is designed to conduct us. As a consequence, they have 
regarded the phenomena connected with the idea of Duty as 
ultimate, and have treated the purpose to do right as the sum 
of all morality. 

I shall trace the genesis of Sense of Obligation on future 
pages. Jt is safe here to assume its universality ; and this 
being admitted a single step will take us to the conclusion 
that the excellence of Rectitude is universally recognized. 
The idea of goodness necessarily enters into that of the dis- 
charge of obligation, and the idea of badness into that of its 
repudiation. We believe it our duty to perform one act 
because it is good, and to refrain from another because it 



MORAL SENTIMENTS. 75 

is bad ; and the quality of goodness or of badness is neces- 
sarily transferred from the act to the purpose to act, or to 
refrain from acting. Hence, when by "Right" we mean 
consonance with obligation, we are inevitably convinced of 
the goodness of the purpose to do right. When the term is 
descriptive of suitableness to a relation the conviction comes 
from another source, but no less certainly. Fitness is one of 
the self-authenticating forms of goodness. It stands in need 
of no auxiliary, but compels approbation by its own inherent 
force. In this case, therefore, the transference of the quality 
from act to purpose ensures the classing of Rectitude as good. 

While I maintain that these and other forms of moral 
excellence come of necessity to be viewed approvingly, I am 
far from asserting that such must continue to be the case. 
The intellective element in these judgments is ineradic- 
able ; but it is possible for a Mind to sink so far below its 
original state that this very belief will become a source of 
dislike. The Consciousness of Badness and comparisons un- 
favorable to itself may cause it to hate what it once loved. 
Thus the knave hates honesty, the miser detests benevolence, 
and the prostitute is enraged at the thought of chastity, 
although it is impossible for them, by any ingenuity in self- 
delusion, or by the most frantic vehemence of volition, to 
cast from themselves the knowledge that the virtues which 
awaken such antagonism are worthy of commendation. 

2. Sense of Justice. 

In contemplating some actions as manifestations of per- 
sonal qualities, we regard them as not only good or bad, but, 
also, as establishing a title to reward or a liability to just 
punishment, and are conscious of an impulse to favor the 



76 THE HEART OF MAN. 

bestowment of the reward or the infliction of the punishment 
which we think to be merited. The obvious sources of this 
sentiment are Susceptibility to Perception of Goodness and 
Perception of Badness, Reactivity, and the Law of Favorable 
Presumption. We are pleased or pained by that which we 
observe ; we have an impulse to' reciprocate the pleasure or 
pain experienced, and we presume that this impulse is justi- 
fiable. The favorable impulse is Complacency and the un- 
favorable one is Indignation. 

It is plain that the growth of this sentiment must keep 
pace with the growth of the Critical Faculty. At first every- 
thing which causes a considerable degree of pleasure or 
pain gives rise to a disposition to reward or punish. The 
infant strikes the stick by which it is hurt, and fondles 
the toy by which it is pleased. Soon, however, it learns 
that only living beings are objects of just reward and pun- 
ishment. Afterward it discriminates between intentional 
and accidental benefit and harm. It learns, also, to make 
allowance for lack of power and lack of knowledge. Then it 
discovers that pain may be inflicted for a good purpose and 
pleasure for a bad one. Finally, it learns that an act or a 
disposition may be of good or ill desert while it has no im- 
mediate connection with benevolence or its opposite. Thus a 
point is soon reached at which there are no farther distinc- 
tions of this nature to be made. Still, these distinctions are 
often overlooked even by adults. Indeed, there are few, if 
any of us, who do not occasionally lose sight of them for a 
moment. Some of the exhibitions of a misdirected Sense of 
Justice are very absurd. A mother, for example, snatches up 
and shakes her little boy for falling and hurting himself. 



MORAL SENTIMENTS. - Y7 

Her parental affection causes her to feel acute pain at wit- 
nessing the boy's suffering ; and, viewing him, for the instant, 
as the originator of that pain, she experiences a sudden im- 
pulse to punish him. If we watch ourselves closely we shall 
all perceive that we are liable to have our indignation excited, 
by their unhappiness, against those for whom our affection is 
deepest. All such facts should serve to impress us with the 
importance of keeping the Critical Faculty in constant train- 
ing. In proportion as it is uneducated, or misdirected. Sense 
of Justice degenerates into mere revenge, or becomes obtuse, 
and we are prone to make consonance with our own desires 
the measure of goodness. 

This sentiment, however it may be perverted, is plainly uni- 
versal and indestructible. The impulse embraced in it is an 
inevitable effect of an Elementary Power in conjunction with 
an Original Susceptibility ; and the conviction, which it in- 
volves, will endure until the necessary presumption in favor 
of the impulse shall be destroyed by the force of evidence. 

At this point we see one of the most important offices of 
Resentment. There are many writings upon 'that subject • 
and I should single out from among them those of Bishop 
Butler as having more value for me than all others that I 
have read. His allusion to human Resentment as an instru- 
ment of Divine Justice opens to our view a throng of realities 
which have an awful significance. He failed to observe how- 
ever, that without this affection there could have been no 
such virtue as human Justice ; that, consequently, human 
character would have lacked its most commanding feature, 
and that human society would have been destitute of its 
mightiest safeguard. 



Y8 THE HEART OF MAN. 

I will permit myself here to turn aside a moment, for the 
purpose of noticing that search after a " Final Cause " which 
is indicated in many discussions of the affections. What I 
am compelled to regard as a misguided Love of Unity has 
led philosophers to assume that the distinctive design of each 
affection is limited to a single end. When, therefore, they 
have discovered one of the offices of an affection, they have 
considered their work completed. But, in reality, it is char- 
acteristic of Wisdom to provide for many ends through a 
single agency. All of these we cannot, without great pre- 
sumption, assume that we are able to discover. There may 
be instances in which we can discern but one, though I am 
satisfied that we should cease to speak of " The Final Cause " 
of any constituent feature of the human Mind. 

3. Self-judgment, 

We now turn our attention upon the sentiment associated 
with reflections upon our own characters as illustrated by our 
external actions and by the features of our mental life. Ac- 
cording as our view of these is favorable or unfavorable, we 
pass a commendatory or condemnatory judgment on our- 
selves. The former judgment is delightful ; the latter pain- 
ful ; and both the pleasure and the pain are susceptible of 
countless modifications dependent on the peculiar coloring of 
our favorable or unfavorable view. We look on ourselves as 
honest or dishonest, as courageous or cowardly, as loyal or 
disloyal, as veracious or false, as benevolent or selfish, as 
magnanimous or mean, as noble or contemptible ; and with 
every variation of the judgment we experience a corre- 
sponding change in the resultant emotion. But all such 
judgments, including both the intellective and the emotive 



MORAL SENTIMENTS. 79 

elements, may be classed either under the head of Self- 
approbation, or under that of Remorse. 

It is a peculiarity of this Sentiment that the conviction, 
which enters into it, precedes and causes the emotion, while 
the immediate legitimate effect of the pleasure or pain be- 
longing to it is the stimulation of Desire of Goodness. The 
primary source of Self-judgment is Susceptibility to Con- 
sciousness of Goodness and Consciousness of Badness ; and 
the strengthening of it is provided for in several dift'erent pro- 
cesses. The emotional part of it is intensified by the reflex 
action of Desire of Goodness, giving the result of an impulse 
gratified or an impulse thwarted. To the same end operate 
two Moral Sentiments of which I shall soon give account. 
Anticipation of Retribution comes in to gladden with its 
promises or to appal with its threatenings. Here, too, is felt 
the exhilarating or the terrible force of Sense of Obligation ; 
and we congratulate ourselves on a duty fulfilled, or .reproach 
ourselves for a duty violated. Finally, Sense of Justice pre- 
sents us to ourselves as entitled to be rewarded or deserving 
to be punished. When we are disposed to grumble about the 
inherited disorder which prevails among our desires and af- 
fections, we should do well to think of all these amazing 
structural provisions for our impulsion toward the realization 
of internal peace. 

The deliverances of the Critical Faculty are more liable 
to be erroneous in connection with Self -judgment than at any 
other point. Though the principal danger lies in the other 
direction, it is unquestionable that erroneous Remorse is 
sometimes experienced. A love, for example, which has be- 
come an avenue of pain in consequence of the suffering or 



80 THE HEART OF MAN. 

death of its object, often re-acts in self -accusations. Thus 
a mother, whose little child has been taken from her, may be 
heard confessing guilt with which she is not chargeable be- 
cause of the withholding of some attention which she had 
not seen to be needful, or because of some punishment which 
she had conscientiously administered. Again, a desponding 
tendency, sometimes occasioned by disease, and sometimes 
resulting from a constitutional lack of vitality, may cause 
one to take unduly dark views of one's own character. But,- 
on the other hand, it is evident that a large majority of man- 
kind think too favorably of themselves. Every hour of ob- 
servation furnishes illustrations of the truth that the wish is 
often "father to the thought." We are always prone to be- 
lieve what we desire to have true ; and so unwelcome is the 
conviction of our own badness that we are inclined to ward it 
off with great persistency. We are apt to become dishonest 
with ourselves and skillful in distorting all evidence pertain- 
ing to our moral state. Indications of badness are over- 
looked, while those of goodness are immensely magnified. 
Moreover, we often try ourselves by a false standard. In- 
stead of adopting for this purpose the highest conception of 
human character which all our means of information enable 
us to form, we measure ourselves by ourselves and compare 
ourselves among ourselves. If we find that we are not mor- 
ally below the average of the community in which we live, 
or of the circle in which we move, we are apt to conclude 
that we are not very different from what we should be. If 
to these causes, all growing out of a vicious state of our 
impulses, we add the familiar principle that no force is ac- 
curately measured until it is resisted, and remember the Law 



MORAL SENTIMENTS. * 81 

of Favorable Presumption, we shall see very clearly that the 
cost of self-knowledge is in direct proportion to its super- 
lative value. It will be plain, too, that anything approaching 
accuracy of self-knowledge presupposes the incessant influ- 
ence of Desire of Goodness on the Critical Faculty. 

4. A7iticipation of Retribution, 

When, in connection with our future welfare, we are con- 
templating an action or a line of conduct, which is either 
unmistakably good or unmistakably bad, we anticipate either 
enjoyment or suffering as a consequence of that action or that 
line of conduct. This immediate eifect of the contemplation 
is realized vrhether the action or conduct lies in the past, or 
is conceived as belonging to the future. According to this 
description, the activity of this Sentiment presupposes some 
measure of practical wisdom. Like other Moral Sentiments, 
Anticipation of Retribution is rendered inoperative for the 
time being by that foolishness, begotten of selfishness, which 
causes all remote consequences to be shut from view. Still, 
the Sentiment is indestructible, because there is a limit to 
the possible paralyzation of Desire of Happiness ; and when 
once that forecasting desire is re-awakened, the vehemence of 
its activity is commensurate with the oppression to which it 
has been subjected, and the consequent recoil from the pros- 
pect of suffering is commensurately full of torture. A man, 
by utter recklessness, may go so far in the way of self-destruc- 
tion as to think but seldom of any consequences of his con- 
duct beyond the satisfaction of the mad impulses that are 
driving him on. But, whatever speculative fogs he may have 
gathered about his understanding, and however angrily he 
may say to himself that there is no such thing as Retribu- 
G 



82 • THE HEART OF MAN. 

tion, the time will never come when he can deliberately re- 
solve on an evil course, with a full view of the evil that is in 
it, and not know that he is resolving foolishly and acting the 
part of an enemy to himself. 

The origination of Anticipation of Retribution is necessi- 
tated by the very nature of our susceptibilities and desires. 
A susceptibility is simply a power to experience pleasure and 
pain ; and all the knowledge, possessed in the first instance, 
of the Primary Media of Pleasure, Knowing, Power, Owner- 
ship, Sympathy, Favorable Regard, Goodness, Foreign Good- 
ness and Foreign Happiness — is derived from the pleasure 
they yield; while the Primary Media of Pain — Not-Know- 
ing, Weakness, Destitution, Lack of Sympathy, Unfavorable 
Regard, Badness, Foreign Badness and Foreign Unhappiness 
— are known only by the pain which they cause. Of neces- 
sity, therefore, the Media of Pleasure are conceived as sources 
of enjoyment, and the Media of Pain take their places in the 
Intellective System as sources of suffering. The two classes 
of Media retain their respective characters when the idea of 
" what is best on the whole " is evolved and Desire of Happi- 
ness comes into being; and they stand thenceforth, respec- 
tively, as sources of happiness and sources of unhappiness. 
By the spontaneous action of Acquisitivity, the Primary 
Media of Pleasure, as sources of happiness, become the re- 
spective objects of the Primary Desires, and these desires are 
stimulated by the recoil of the Heart from the Primary 
Media of Pain as sources of unhappiness. Thus it is made 
impossible for the Mind ever to shake off the true conviction, 
that the several Primary Media of Pleasure are promotive of 
happiness and that their respective opposites are promotive 



MORAL SENTIMENTS. 83 

of unhappiness. It is needless to say that what is true of all 
these Media, of both classes, must be true of each one of them 
and, therefore, true of Goodness and Badness. Much more 
than this : we can all testify that, although the presence of 
other Media of Pain may cause us a certain feeling of humili- 
ation, it excites no emotion of that nature comparable as to 
intensity with that which enters into the Remorse we experi- 
ence from Consciousness of Moral Badness. Consequently, 
we know that the structural provisions for the conviction 
which connects Badness with the causation of unhappiness, 
are far more potent than those which yield the conviction of a 
like causative force in other Media of Pain. These considera- 
tions make it unquestionable that Anticipation of Retribu- 
tion is a necessary, as well as an indestructible. Sentiment. 
Hence, it is entitled to all the evidential weight of an intui- 
tion. The Sentiment, in most cases, is strengthened im- 
mensely by the conception of a Just Moral Government, a 
conception for the evolution of which all the Moral Senti- 
ments co-operate. Very often, indeed, it takes its color 
chiefly from that conception, while the idea of causation 
subsides. 

A justification of Anticipation of Retribution, by the in- 
ductive method, is an easy matter for any one who will be 
at the pains to observe what is taking place within him and 
what is going on around him. 

5. Sense of Obligation, 

In pre-considering a possible action or possible series of 
actions, whether it be external or purely mental, we are con- 
vinced of an obligation to act or to refrain from acting, and 
have an impulse, more or less strong, toward such acting or 



84 THE HEART OF MAN. 

refraining. This sentiment necessarily involves the recogni- 
tion of authority, and is characterized by imperativeness. In 
expressing it we use the words "Right" and "Wrong," 
"Obligation," " Duty," " Ought," and sometimes "Must." 
We have the same conviction in connection with the possible 
actions of others, and often, though not necessarily, we desire 
the fulfillment of the apprehended or supposed obligation. 

To account for this Sentiment, we must scrutinize the fact 
of obligation ; and we find a clue to its contents in the cir- 
cumstance that we sometimes express it by the word " Must." 
This word is suggestive of necessity ; and, paradoxical as it 
may appear, it is nevertheless true that we often recognize the 
necessity of a free choice. It is not uncommon for us to say 
of a voluntary action, " It was very unpleasant for me, but I 
had to do it ; I couldn't help it." This recognition is not al- 
ways associated with Sense of Obligation, but may, on the 
contrary, be diametrically opposed to it. One may be heard 
saying, " I know that I ought not to take that course, but, 
somehow, I mjustP It is easy enough to understand the state 
of mind thus indicated. Through self-indulgence and the law 
of Growth by Exercise, some desire, entirely commendable 
within its legitimate sphere, has become so inordinately strong 
as to predominate over Desire of Goodness. This may be 
called a Selfish recognition of IsTecessity. But there is on the 
other hand a Self-denying recognition of Necessity, in which 
we are moved to say, " It is my duty to do it, and I must do 
it whatever the consequences." Now, in such a case as this 
two circumstances are always present. In the first place. De- 
sire of Goodness has become operative, and, in the second 
place, that operativeness has been achieved through a conflict 



MORAL SENTIMENTS. 85 

with powerful opposing impulses. Such cases are frequent in 
the experience of every man who has not completely turned 
his back on personal goodness as an object of endeavor ; and 
it is plain that in this self-denying recognition of necessity, 
Desire. of Goodness becomes imperative, and asserts its right 
to exercise dominion over all other impulses. Or, to speak 
without a figure, there is an actual exercise of dominion by 
Desire of Goodness and under the law of Favorable Presump- 
tion, there arises a conviction of the rightfulness of that 
dominion. It is true that, by reason of the same law there 
may be a temporary conviction of the rightful authority of a 
selfish impulse. Indeed, it is possible for a man to submit so 
abjectly and for so long a period to enslavement by selfish de- 
sire, that his debauched understanding will regard obedience 
to the enslaving impulse in the light of a duty. Let us sup- 
pose that he is both avaricious and strongly inclined to expen- 
sive self-indulgence. So long as the two forms of selfishness 
nearly balance each other, he says " I ought not to spend my 
money in this way ;" and he uses this language because he 
sees that the objects of avarice are more enduring than those 
of the inclination to self-indulgence, and, therefore, that the 
former impulse is better entitled than the latter to furnish a 
rule of conduct. At length, by vigorous self-discipline, he 
raises avarice to the position of a ruling passion, and then, 
whenever the opposing inclination becomes violent, he says, 
" I must not fool away my money." Indeed, he often uses 
this language when resisting the highest impulses of which 
he is capable. He has consented to the supremacy of avarice 
and permitted it to prescribe a law to which he habitually 
ascribes a rightful authoritativeness. It is in the course of con- 



86 THE HEART OF MAN. 

flicts between impulses that his avarice has become imperative, 
and in consequence of such conflicts that he employs the 
words properly expressive of Sense of Obligation, and resolves 
on obedience to a law. 

The process just traced may serve to illustrate the manner 
in which the Law of Goodness comes to be recognized. There 
is, however, an immeasurable difference between the two cases. 
The presumption in favor of the supremacy of the selfish 
desire is destroyed in the first moment of honest scrutiny ; 
the conviction of rightfulness, therefore, falls away, and the 
law is seen to have no foundation. On the other hand, the 
more we investigate the grounds of our conviction, that the 
supremacy of Desire of Goodness is rightful, the stronger and 
more vivid it becomes, and the more commanding in our 
view are the sanctions with which the Law of Goodness is 
clothed. In the one case the conviction is fortuitous and 
easily destroyed ; in the other it is necessary and ineradicable. 
There is a vast difference, also, between the penalties con- 
ceived in connection, respectively, with violations of the two 
laws. The avaricious man fears only the loss of money as a 
consequence of disobedience to the law which he has made to 
himself, while the man whose other impulses are dominated 
by Desire of Goodness, fears only the penalty of personal bad- 
ness. This difference is seen most clearly when the two men 
are contemplating one and the same action. We may hear 
the one say, "I must pay this debt, or I shall be sued and sub- 
jected to costs," while the other says, "I must pay this debt, 
or I shall be dishonest." To be sure, in the latter case. Antici- 
pation of Retribution is apt to come in with a menace of 
future suffering ; but personal badness is the only penalty of 



MORAL SENTIMENTS. 87 

which a conception may properly be said to enter into Sense 
of Obligation. Moreover, the avaricious man knows that the 
law which he obeys is one which he has created for himself 
and for himself alone. He may have so mutilated his under- 
standing as to be, much of the time, under an illusory impres- 
sion of obedience to a law imposed from above. But, when- 
ever he looks directly at the nature of his law, he cannot fail 
to see that it is simply a rule of conduct which he has adopted 
only for himself. On the other hand, we cannot conceive the 
Law of Goodness as having been created by ourselves, or as a 
law whose authoritativeness is limited to ourselves. We are 
conscious of recognizing a law already in existence ; and it is 
impossible for us to believe that any rational created being is 
exempt from the obligations of that law. Let me say here 
that by " recognizing " a law, I mean simply apprehending its 
existence. We are compelled to believe that the Law of 
Goodness is, and always will be, in force, whether we purpose 
to obey it or not. This compulsory recognition arises from 
that necessary conviction of the inseparableness of Goodness 
and Happiness, as cause and effect, of which I have traced the 
origin in accounting for Anticipation of Retribution, together 
with the imperativeness of which we become conscious 
through conflicts of Desire of Goodness with selfish impulses. 
We are forced to believe that Goodness must yield enjoyment, 
and that Badness must yield suffering ; and, by reason of the 
Intuition of Causation, we recognize a cause of that necessity. 
Very properly we give to that cause the name of "Law"; for 
the idea of something by virtue of which a necessity exists is 
fundamental in our conceptions of Law, whether our thoughts 
are in the physical, the mental, or the moral realm. Although, 



88 THE HEART OF MAN. 

as we have just seen, ideas of enjoyment and suffering are 
immediately concerned in necessitating the recognition of the 
Law of Goodness, I still maintain that they do not necessarily 
enter into Sense of Obligation. The Moral Sentiments have 
their several functions, but have nothing to say concerning 
the factors that have been operative in their origination. 
After much reflection on the matter, I am very sure that, dur- 
ing the sole activity of Sense of Obligation, we see Goodness 
as an end in itself, and have no thought of ulterior benefit. 

I think I have now traced all the contents of the Senti- 
ment under consideration to their sources, and am prepared 
to give the following definition : Sense of Obligation is Desire 
of Goodness, made imperative by the opposition of selfish 
impulses, aiid associated with the recognition of the Law of 
Goodness as eternal and universally authoritative. 

I have been, at times, very near concluding that this Sen- 
timent involves the recognition of a personal Ruler, as well 
as of a Law. This view may, at the first glance, seem to be 
supported by some of the terms we use. It may appear difii- 
cult to think of Obligation, or Duty, apart from a personal 
Being entitled to demand fulfillment ; and it is plain that the 
use of these terms involves an assumption of the existence of 
such a Being. I have no doubt, indeed, that " Obligation " 
and "Duty" first came to be used in consequence of the con- 
ception of One possessing a supreme right to require Good- 
ness in character and conduct. Nevertheless, by experiment 
and observation, we find it unquestionable that the relation 
indicated by these words, — the owing of obedience to the Law 
of Goodness — can be, and, in fact, habitually is, so abstracted 
from all that is above it as to be a temporary terminus of 



MORAL SENTIMENTS. 89 

thought. Hence, it is only in consequence of a premature sus- 
pension of analytic labor that the recognition of a Ruler is 
ever supposed to belong to the essence of Sense of Obliga- 
tion. 

Although it is not strictly pertinent to the aim of this 
chapter, I think it best to say that I am as confident of the 
existence of a structural necessity to recognize Deity, as I am 
of any fact pertaining to the human Mind. It is true that 
there are able men, whose vocation embraces a constant obser- 
vation of the operations of law, who have much to say con- 
cerning the immutability of all laws, who, in every sentence 
they utter, as well as at every step in their investigation^, are 
compelled to assume the veracity of Intuition of Causation, 
and who yet seem desirous to have us believe that they find 
no place in the universe for a Lawmaker, but regard law itself 
as the ultimate goal of human thinking, and a barrier above 
which the Intuition of Causation never lifts itself. It is 
obvious that these gentlemen are unaware of what has hap- 
pened to them. Had. they observed themselves as faithfully 
as they have studied the things that can be seen and handled, 
they would never have blundered so enormously. Of course, 
it is easy enough to ^''forget God." That, indeed, is our over- 
shadowing danger. It is easy enough for us to construct 
barriers to thought, and to form the habit of arresting our 
thinking at such artificial obstructions. In fact, such a habit 
inevitably grows up w^henever any matter is for a long time 
of absorbing interest, and there is no operative motive to pass 
beyond it. Thus to the miser money is the " Be-all and the 
end-all," beyond which his thoughts never travel. The ex- 
planation is found in the mastery of thoughts by impulses 



90 THE HEART OF MAN. 

together with the law of Growth by Exercise. It is by virtue 
of these forces that all intellectual habits are formed; and it is 
precisely this that has been experienced by those to whom 
matter and its laws have become the universe. They have a 
right, so far as we are concerned, to felicitate themselves on 
the paralysis of their highest faculties ; but it is not wise to 
accept them as teachers concerning matters with which all 
their intellectual habits have contributed to unlit them for 
dealing. Let them teach as they may, however, the great 
body of cultivated men, as well as the masses of mankind, 
giving free course to the spontaneous activity of their facul- 
ties, will continue to view the Moral Law and all other laws 
and all forms of matter, in the light of effects^ however potent 
they may see them to be, also, as secondary causes. And 
whether the chain of cause and effect, which they may con- 
template, be long or short,* they will find its beginning in the 
" Cause of causes." At that goal of Infinitude, and there 
alone, the restless Intuitive Faculty, if subject to no violence, 
can find repose. But it is not in this character alone that 
Deity is necessarily recognized. In connection with Anti- 
cipation of Retribution, it is not so much the causation of 
law, as its certain execution, that is present to one's thoughts. 
Both from that Sentiment and from the recognition of the 
Law of Goodness, commonly called the " Moral Law," there 
inevitably springs a conception of attributes which can be 
ascribed only to a personal Being. Justice, Voluntariness and 
an Intelligence from which nothing can be hidden are neces- 
sarily recognized both in the causation and in the administra- 
tion of the Law. Thus is necessitated the conviction of the 
existence of a Supreme Ruler. Moreover, the Mind presents 



MORAL SENTIMENTS. 91 

structural provisions for his recognition in three different 
ways, as an all-powerful Helper. When mighty forces rise 
before us threatening us with destruction, and we fairly see 
our impotence to withstand them. Desire of Happiness impels 
us to an invocation in which God is treated as the only Being 
who can deliver us. Again, Desire of Happiness, conjoined 
with Consciousness of Badness and Anticipation of Retribu- 
tion moves us to cry for mercy, and for deliverance from that 
evil within ourselves which we see to be a cause of unimagin- 
able suffering. Finally, amid the tortures of Remorse, con- 
nected with a just appreciation of the terrible force of evil 
dispositions. Desire of Goodness impels us to invoke the Al- 
mighty One for rescue from the doom of eternal Badness. I 
thoroughly believe that all adult human beings of sound mind 
have passed through all these experiences, and, therefore, that 
all such persons, by virtue of their own organization, have 
arrived necessarily at the recognition of God as the all-power- 
ful, all-wise and voluntarily acting, Firist Cause, Ruler and 
Helper. " So that they are without excuse." 

If these things are true, it follows that God is not rightly 
named " The Unknowable." I freely admit, however, that the 
Agnostic philosophers have proved most abundantly that the 
human race stands in need of an external and a special revel- 
ation concerning Deity. It is well to remember, also, that 
some of the same philosophers, by their masterly disclosures 
of the correspondence, running through all the works of 
nature, between needs and provisions for satisfying them, 
have furnished materials for a weighty argument in support 
of the antecedent probability of such a revelation. 

It will be observed that I have not employed the word 



92 THE HEART OF MAN. 

'' Conscience" in discussing the Moral Sentiments. My reason 
is, that I saw in it only a source of confusion, and found no 
place for it with any meaning that I have ever seen attached 
to it. If used at all in scientific nomenclature, it should be 
restricted to Sense of Obligation. But I think it clearly best 
to dispense with it altogether as a scientific term, and let it 
continue to stand in popular literature for a conventional em- 
bodiment of all the Moral Sentiments, together with the 
moral function of the Critical Faculty. 

An exhaustive examination of the Heart of Man would 
extend to the sentiments, embraced under the head of " Natural 
Religion"; but the discussion of these is not comprehended 
in my present design. 

CONCLUSION. 

I have finished the task which I proposed to myself. 
Whether my views will, or will not, receive any consideration, 
is a matter concerning which I have kept myself entirely free 
from expectation. I believe myself to have made some dis- 
coveries, though, with my limited reading, I am unable to say 
to what extent I may have been anticipated in the communi- 
cation of them. If there is important and newly ascertained 
truth set forth in these pages, it will get into circulation 
through some channel " in the fulness of time." I had these 
things to write, and I have written them ; and I choose to 
print and distribute a small edition of my treatise. It is alto- 
gether certain that I shall be satisfied with the result. I have 
no doubt that I shall come to see some of the points, on which 
I have touched, in a new light, nor that, if I should re-write 
this paper a year hence, I should modify some of my state- 



MORAL SENTIMENTS. 93 

ments. Still, I will be frank enough to say that I am in no 
doubtful frame of mind so far as my principal conclusions a^re 
concerned. For a good number of years, I have occasionally 
tested, at various points, what I venture to call my theory of 
the Mind, by a somewhat habitual observation of myself and 
the persons around me ; and the result has been uniformly 
satisfactory. As to the doctrine, that the human Mind is an 
organized Being with a life of surpassing complexity, and with 
structural provisions for an infinitely greater variety of 
changes, processes, interactions and blendings, than is pro- 
vided for in any corporeal organism on Earth, any material 
alteration of my opinion strikes me as an impossible event. 
In my hours of most humiliating self -distrust, when I see the 
limitations of my faculties most clearly, and am most ashamed 
of my proneness to intellectual blundering, my convictions on 
that and some other fundamental points stand out with no 
mists of doubt around them. I am confident that the five 
Elementary Powers, and the fiye Systems in which they 
respectively inhere, are substantially as I have described them ; 
and I think I see, with a fair measure of distinctness, the 
various processes concerned in the origination of volitions, 
and in the geneses of the Moral Sentiments. 

In pointing out the phenomena of mental life, I have had 
occasion to disclose but very few glimpses of the animal life 
co-ordinated with it ; and the conception of the former life as 
still going on, after the extinction of the latter, is infinitely 
easier to me now than it was when I first entered on these 
researches. 



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